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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This civil appeal brought by the Appellants, Satsudas, as buyers and the Appellees, 
Ohs, as sellers of a forty (40) unit motel, known as Capitol Motel and located at 1792 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Satsudas filed their complaint on March 15, 1991 alleging three cause of actions: 
(1) Breach of the Express Warranties contained in the Earnest Money Agreement between 
Satsudas and Ohs, dated November 16, 1989; (2) Intentional misrepresentation and failure 
to disclose, a breach of implied covenant to deal in good faith; and (3) Fraud (R.O.A. 2-7). 
Addendum No. 1: 
Ohs filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to joint an indispensable party, i.e., Ohs' 
predecessor, Ums, third party defendants. (R.O.A. 22-26). The motion was denied on 
June 24, 1991. 
Ohs filed a Third Party Complaint against Ums. The first three causes of action is 
similar to Satsudas' complaint. Ohs added a fourth claim of action for indemnification and 
contribution for any judgment against Ohs by Satsudas; fifth cause of action requests 
punitive damages and the sixth cause of action alleges unjust enrichment (R.O.A. 52-56). 
Addendum No. 2: 
Ums filed a Motion to Quash Service of Process on September 25, 1991. After 
various pleadings between Ohs and Ums, the Motion to Quash was granted on January 4, 
1993 without prejudice (R.O.A. 163-165). 
Ohs appealed the Order quashing the service of process (R.O.A. 177-178) on 
February 2, 1993. 
Ohs' Motion to Reconsider or In the Alternative, Motion for Leave to File Third 
Party Complaint reiterating Satsudas' claims, requesting indemnity and reimbursement for 
Ums should Satsudas prevail in their claim against Ohs and adding three independent 
causes of action. 
After the trial, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim and Third Party Complaint 
and awarded Ohs Attorney's fees of $44,959.86 (Judgment entered May 5, 1995 and June 
9, 1995). Addendum 7-8. 
Also the Court awarded Urns attorney's fees against Plaintiffs in the amount of 
$56,126.77. (Supplemental Judgment entered July 7,1995). Addendum 18-19. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the abrogation clause (paragraph O of Earnest Money Agreement) 
reserving express warranties survives the merger doctrine set forth in Secor v. Knight, 716 
P.2d 970 (Utah 1986) Maynard v. Wharton, 284 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, February 23, 1996. 
Appellate standard for review of the Court's determination is one of "correctness". 
Schafir v. Harrigan, 849 P2d 1384, (Ut. App. 1984) No particular defense is given to the 
Court ruling on questions of law. Provo River Water Users v. Morgan,, 857 P.2d 927, 
931 (Utah 1993), Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P 2d 1366 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Whether the express warranties in the Earnest Money Agreement as to the 
plumbing, heating, air conditioning, ventilating, electrical systems, comes within the 
exception to the merger doctrine, as collateral rights which survive the merger doctrine. 
Appellate standard for. review is one of correctness. Schafir v. Harrigan, 
Supra, Provo Water Users Association v. Morgan, Supra. 
3. Whether representations and understanding of the Satsudas and Ohs that a 
forty (40) unit rental operation was being sold and purchased, renders the Ohs legally 
responsible for the cost of restoration and loss of profits arising from the closure of the 
units to meet the parties' understanding. 
Standard for review is the Court's Finding of Facts are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P2d 1281 (Utah 1993). The 
Court's Finding of Facts would be clearly erroneous if they are lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Doelle vs. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 
1989). 
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4. Whether the Ohs breached their obligation to perform and contact in good 
faith when Ohs represented that the Capitol Motel had forty (40) rental units and had 
income arising from the rents of forty (40) units after being advised by his predecessor, 
Urns, that five to six of the rooms were added without a building permit. 
Standard for review: Appellant must marshal evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite the evidence the Court finding one so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of evidence. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co., 818, R2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). 
5. Whether Satsudas met their burden of proof, i.e.; clear and convincing 
evidence that Ohs' actions constituted fraud when Ohs sold a forty (40) unit remodeled 
motel, knew that some of the rooms were built without complying with code requirements. 
Satsudas were induced the purchase by the income reportedly to be made from a forty (40) 
unit operation and the Satsudas relied on Ohs' representation and could not have discovered 
that the rooms were not in conformity by the visual inspection of the premises. 
Standard for review: The standard for review is similar to issue 3 and 4. 
6. Whether Ohs are entitled to attorneys fees against Satsudas under wording 
of the Earnest Money Agreement which, if abrogated and merged into the closing 
documents, would necessarily eliminate any contractual basis for awarding Ohs attorney's 
fees. 
Standard for Review is one of correctness and no particular deference given 
to the Trial Court ruling in question of law. Provo River Water User v. Morgan, Supra. 
7. Whether the Deed of Trust and Trust Deed Note between Ohs and Satsudas 
serve as a contractual basis for awarding Ohs' attorney's fees when Satsuda were not in 
default in their obligation under the Trust Deed or Trust Deed Note. 
Standard for Review is the same as Issue No. 6. 
8. Whether the Assignment of Contract between the Ohs, as assignors and 
Satsudas, as Asignees, serve as a contractual bases for awarding attorney's fees to Ohs 
against the Satsudas where there is no act or omission with the Satsudas to trigger a breach 
or default by Satsuda in relation with the Satsudas' performance in the real estate contract. 
Standard for Review is the same as Issue No. 6. 
9. Whether the Assignment of Contract between the Ohs and Satsudas can be a 
contractual bases for awarding attorney's fees to Urns against Satsudas when there is not 
breach or default by Satsudas in their performance to pay Urns. 
Standard for Review is the same as Issue No. 6. 
10. Whether the Real Estate Contract between the Ohs and Ums is a contract basis 
for awarding attorney's fees to Ums against the Satsudas where the Paragraph 15 of the 
real estate contract reads 
"Attorney's Fees: Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of the 
covenants or agreements herein contained, the non-defaulting party or, should litigation be 
commenced, the prevailing party in litigation shall be entitled to all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or 
terminating this contract, or in obtaining possession of the Property, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law" and where there is no action enforcing or 
terminating the real estate contract for or against the Satsudas. 
Standard for Review is the same as No. 6. 
11. Whether the reasonableness of Ohs claim for attorneys fees can be legally 
sustained where the Ohs verified application for attorney's fees fails to state that the fees 
billed for the total representation of the case, i.e., defense of Satsudas claim and 
prosecution of third party complaint are fees customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services. 
Standard for Review is the same as No. 6. 
12. Whether the reasonableness of the fee charged by Grant W. P. Morrison, 
defendant's predecessor attorney can be legally sustained without a verification by Grant 
W. P. Morrison and based solely upon Mr. Morrison's billing to the Ohs. 
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12. Whether the reasonableness of the fee charged by Grant W. P. Morrison, 
defendant's predecessor attorney can be legally sustained without a verification by Grant 
W. P. Morrison and based solely upon Mr. Morrison's billing to the Ohs. 
Standard for Review as to the reasonableness of attorney's fees is in the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of 
clear abuse. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P2d 985 (UT1988). Although considerable 
deference is accorded the factual finding, conclusions of law arising from these findings are 
to be reviewed for correctness and are given no special deference on appeal, Bingham v. 
Bingham, 872 P2d 1065. 
13. Whether the reasonableness of the total fee claimed by the Ohs can be 
sustained where verified application for attorney's fees includes attorneys fees for the 
defense of Satsudas' claims and the prosecution of Third Party Complaint without 
delineating or segregating which fees are applicable to the separate actions. 
Standard for review is same as issue No. 1 and No. 12 . 
14. Whether the liability of Satsudas for Urns' attorney's fees can be legally 
sustained under the "pass through theory" under Collier v. Heinz, 827 P2d 982 (UT. App. 
1992) where there is no breach of contract or negligence asserted or claimed by the 
Satsudas, Ohs or Ums and where there are no facts to support the trial court's finding that 
•the third party attorney's fees is a necessary step by the defendant to defend Satsudas' 
claims. 
Standard for review is one for corrections, Provo River Waters Ass'n v. Morgan, 
Supra. 
15. Whether the trial Court erred in granting a partial summary judgment against the 
plaintiffs' damage claim when the plaintiffs' damages included cost of restoration and loss 
of income, over and above the benefit of the bargain rule. 
Standard for review is one of correctness as stated in paragraph 1 and 2 
above. 
n 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The appellate is not aware of any determinative provisions, statutes or ordinances, 
rules or regulations which would be determinative of the appeal. The appellants will rely 
principally upon case law and building ordinances which are set forth in the table of 
contents 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties entered into a Statement of Stipulated Facts. (R.O.A V3,1184-1194). 
Addendum, 3. The essential facts, set forth in the Statement of Stipulated Facts may be 
summarized. 
UMS-OHS HISTORY 
Mr. Um, an experienced real estate and involved in buying and selling of real 
estate, purchased the Capitol Motel on September 1, 1982. He owned and operated the 
motel for five years during which time he made improvements to the structure, altered some 
of the motel to operate a grocery store, and notably, converted the grocery store into five 
additional rental units, giving the Capitol Motel a total of forty (40) rooms available for 
rent. 
Mr. Um knew that no building permit had been obtained for the conversion of the 
grocery store into these five additional rooms nor did Um instruct his contractor to obtain a 
permit. (RDA V3,1786). 
Mr. Um states that the kitchenette units were installed by his predecessor, i.e.; prior 
to September 1982. (Tr. 267, L 13-14). He placed an add in the 1984 telephone directory 
advertising kitchenette units (Tr. 267, L 14-15). No such kitchenettes were listed in the 
1983 telephone directory. (Stip. Exh. #11). 
Also in 1984, Mr. Um advertised forty (40) remodeled units in the telephone 
directory. (Sti. Exh. #11). 
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Mr. Um applies for and renews the Salt Lake City license for 34 rooms. (Statement 
of Stipulated Facts V3, 1187, par. 18). He further advises Oh to do the same. (Tr. 159, 
L20) (Tr. 164, L23). 
In the negotiations with Oh, Um reported to Oh that he had remodeled and 
reconstructed and fixed up the rooms and made repairs to the motel. (Statement of 
Stipulated Facts, V3, P 1188, para. 2) On two occasions Um told Oh that the 5-6 rooms 
were built without a building permit (Tr. 158, L 22-25) (Tr. 159, Ll-4) (Statement of 
Stipulated Facts, V3 P. 1192, Para. 46), Addendum 3. 
Subsequendy, in 1986, Um passed a fire inspection after repairs were made to 
repair the roof. (Tr. 1266, L. 8-11). However, the records show that the building permit 
was issued in October, 1984 (Stip. Exh. 26) and had nothing to do with the five additional 
units. (Tr. 168, L7-10) 
The routine inspection by the Health Department and Fire Department noted 
deficiencies relating to each of their respective spheres of interest during 1982-1987. (Stip. 
Trial Exh., 2-7) For the most part, 34 rooms were listed in the business license from 1982 
to 1989 when Satsudas purchased the motel. 
SATSUDA-OH TRANSACTION 
Satsuda purchased the motel from Ohs in November, 1989. The earnest money for 
$620,000.00 was signed on November 16, 1989. (Stip. Trial Exh. 14). Mr. Satsuda had 
no prior experience in the purchase or operation of a motel. (Tr.-5, L4). 
During the negotiations, Ohs verbally represented and Ohs business card reported 
that Capitol Motel was a 40 unit motel (R.O.A. V3, 1190). This representation was 
consistent with the 1989-1990 Salt Lake Telephone Directory listing forty (40) remodeled 
rooms in 1989-90, an increase from 34 rooms listed in the same directory in 1983. (Stip. 
Exh. 11) (Tr. 9, L 15-18) 
Additionally, Oh gave Satsuda income figures for 1987 through 1989 showing 
rental income from 40 rooms. (Statement of income figures were made by Mr. Kim, a real 
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estate agent who worked in behalf of Mr. Oh. (Tr. 242, L 10) (Tr. 246, L16-17) Mr. Kim 
got the income figure from Mr. Oh. (Tr. 243, L 15-16) 
Subsequent income figures were provided by the Ohs in the fourth meeting. (Tr. 
16, L 10-17, Exh. 38) 
Mr. Kim testified that a forty (40) unit rental motel was involved and that Oh stated 
that Oh did not tell Mr. Kim that any units cannot be rentable" (Tr. 245, L6-9) and so 
represented to Satsuda (Tr. 245, L 11-12). Mr. Kim prepared the Earnest Money 
Agreement (Tr. 245, L14-15). Mr. Kim was paid $6,200.00 by Ohs. (Tr. 246, L19) 
The income figures were produced by Ohs at the second meeting (Tr. 10, Exh. 37). 
Again, income from the 40 units operation (Statement of Stipulated Facts, V3, 1194, Para. 
35). 
Thereafter, Satsudas inspected four to five rooms (Exhibit 38) selected by the Ohs, 
situated in the outside perimeter of the horse shoe shape building (Tr. 13, L 7-14). 
Satsudas were denied inspection of some thirteen rooms in the building housing the office 
because they were occupied (Tr. 13, L 18-24). Satsudas also inspected the laundry room 
also in the main perimeter of the horse shoe shaped building. (Tr. 18, L 14) 
After the inspection of five rooms and laundry room, Ohs stated that they should 
trust him and that the other rooms would be in good condition as the four to five rooms 
inspected. (Tr. 20, Ll-4) 
Mr. Oh never reported that seven rooms had kitchenettes installed without building 
permits and that units 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39 were constructed without building permits. 
(Tr. 20, L5-11). 
Mr. Satsuda and Ms. Satsuda raised the subject matter of the parking lots in their 
discussion with the Ohs. Oh stated that there was no problems. (Tr. 176, L8-9) 
The following documents were signed at the closing on January 5, 1990. (Stip. 
Exh. 8) 
1. Warranty Deed. 
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6. Trust Deed Note 
7. Other documents relating to personal property 
Satsudas commenced operation of the motel on January 1, 1990. (Stip. Facts, V3, 
1190, Para. 38). He operated the motel for five days prior to the closing date of January 5, 
1990. (Tr. 25,L25) 
On January 2, 1990, Satsudas went to the Salt Lake Business Licensing Officer to 
get a business license for Capitol Motel under his name. He did not take the old license 
with him. (Tr. 26, L24-19) The clerk accessed the computer and wrote the application. 
(Tr. 26, L17-21). He did examine the business license on January 1, 1990 but did not 
notice the number of rooms listed... (Stip. Fact, 1191, Para. 39) 
Satsudas received a receipt from the Business License Department. 
Lawrence Suggars, Building License Inspector, came to the motel on January 31, 
1990. He examined the rooms and ultimately issued a Notice of Deficiency in conjunction 
with plumbing and electrical inspectors called in by Mr. Suggars. (Tr. 30, L3-25). The 
plumbing and electrical deficiencies were hidden and not readily observable by walking into 
the room. (Tr. 31, L21-25) (Tr. 32, L18-212) (Tr. 33, Ll-21). 
The Notice of Deficiency (Stip. Exh. 15) states: 
Code Violation -Interior Inspection 
UHC 1001 (e,f) Units 2-7 have been converted to units with cooking facilities 
without conforming to electrical and plumbing requirements and must be brought up to 
code, open electrical, improper vents, traps and waist lines. 
UHC 1001 (e,f,b) Units 0 and 34-40 have been added to the complex without 
conforming with plumbing and electrical requirements, open electrical, improper vents, 
traps and waist lines. 
Further, the Notice of Deficiency states that the additional units were added without 
complying with the 21.12.010 of City Code which requires that all zoning codes be met at 
the time of conversion ....required parking provided. 
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"Each building is also required under Section 104 of the building code to meet all 
building codes at the time of the addition or alteration." 
"Because of the deficiency, the building was determined to be substandard and 
declared a public nuisance..." Addendum 3. 
Unit #35 was permanently closed to occupancy Addendum 23. 
Satsudas also received the notice and order from the Salt Lake City Corporation, 
Department of Building and Health Services, issued on February 12, 1990 requiring 
Satsudas to correct the deficiency listed in the Notice of Deficiency (Stip. Facts, Exhibit 
29). Addendum 22. 
The notice and order required that work to correct the deficiency commence within 
five days from the date and the notice or secure the rooms by having all doors locked. 
(Stip. Facts, Exh. 29). Pursuant to that notice and order and conversation with Larry 
Suggars, Satsudas closed rooms 0-7 upstairs and rooms 35 to 39 downstairs. (Tr. 37, 
L10-11). Room 35 and room 37 remained occupied with Mr. Suggars' permission due to 
the tenant's infirmities. (Tr. 37,15-18). Mr. Suggars denies he told Satsudas to close the 
rooms. (Tr. 131) 
Satsudas began construction on repairs of rooms 1 through 6. The cost of the 
restoration to conform to code was $13,621.00 (Tr. 39, L21-25) (Stip. Exh. 16). These 
rooms were available for rent in September of 1990. 
The other rooms, 0, 7, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39 presented a different problem. 
Capitol Motel was only zoned for 33 rooms; i.e., one parking stall for each room. The 
restoration of the additional rooms could not be accomplished unless Satsuda obtained a 
parking variance (Stip. Facts, V3, 1192, Para. 48, 49). The variance was approved in 
November, 1990 and Satsudas incurred $2,500.00 in attorney's fees. (Stip. Facts, V3, 
1192, Para. 50-52) 
Restoration of rooms 0, 7, 36 through 39 started in February 1991 and completed 
in March, 1991 (Stip. Fact, V3, 1192, Para. 50, 5). Room 35 was permanently closed. 
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(Tr. 46, L7). Satsudas paid $23,666.00 for the restoration of these rooms to conform to 
code (Tr. 46, L23 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS A 
CONTRACTUAL BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
OHS. 
The award of attorney's fees was mentioned in the Finding of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law and judgment dated May 2, 1995 (R.O.A. 1653) Addendum 7 and 8 
in favor of defendants, Ohs, against plaintiffs, Satsudas, for attorney's fees. The award 
fails to be supported by any findings of fact as to the basis of the award of attorney's fees 
to Ohs. 
The first Amended Order of Dismissal of Complaint and Third Party Complaint and 
Judgment in favor of the defendants, Ohs, against the Plaintiffs, Satsudas, for attorney's 
fees in paragraph 3 is the first factual basis for attorney's fees. (R.O.A. 1715). Addendum 
12 and 13. 
JUDGMENT STATES: 
The trial court's "finding that the attorney's fees requested are reasonable and 
necessary and that an adequate basis in contract exists for such award." Emphasis mine. 
(R.O.A. 001717, paragraph 4). Addendum 12 and 13. 
The trial court fails to disclose which contract upon which the award of Ohs' 
attorney's fees is based and fails to make any finding to the basis therefore which would be 
sufficient to reverse the trial court's award. 
However, a detailed examination of each of the contracts between the Satsudas and 
Ohs is made to determine as a matter of law, the correctness of the trial court's ruling. Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P2d 985 (Utah 1988). 
n 
GENERAL LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Attorney's fees are awardable only if provided for by statute or contract and if, by 
contract, only as the contract allows by its terms, Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P2d 
985,988 (UT1988), Mountain States broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P2d 551 (Ut. App. 
1989); Collier v. Heinz, 827 P2d 982 (Ut. App. 1992), and cases cited therein; Grahn v. 
Gregory , 800 P2d 320 (Ut. App. 1990). 
"In Utah, attorney's fees authorized by contract are awardable only in accordance 
with the explicit terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted by the contract". 
Turtle Management, Inc., v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P2d 667, 671 (Ut. 1982); 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co., v. Neale, 783 P2d 551, 555-56 (Ut. App. 2989), 
Maynard v. Wharton, 284 Utah Ad. Rep. 35, filed February 23, 1996. Emphasis mine. 
Plaintiffs' cause of action was for breach of warranties in the Earnest Money 
Agreement (Exh. 14), intentional misrepresentation and failure to bargain with the plaintiffs 
in good faith. Addendum 1. 
Only one cause of action relied upon a written agreement, i.e.; Earnest Money 
Agreement between the Satsudas and Ohs. First Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 19, (R.O.A. 001708). Addendum 7 and 8. 
EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
The trial court ruled that under the merger doctrine set forth more recently in Schafir 
v. Harrigan, 849 P2d 1384,(Ut. App. 1984), the Earnest Money Agreement was merged 
into the closing documents, i.e.; Special Warranty Deed, Deed of Trust, Promissory Note 
and that delivery of the Warranty Deed, extinguished all of the terms of the November 16, 
1989 Earnest Money Agreement. 
The trial court's ruling needs to be consistently applied and if so applied, the 
Plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees, based upon the Earnest Money Agreement must also 
fail. Bodenhauser v. Patterson, 563 P2d 1212 (Oregon 1977) held that a successful suit 
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and that delivery of the Warranty Deed, extinguished all of the terms of the November 16, 
1989 Earnest Money Agreement. 
The trial court's ruling needs to be consistently applied and if so applied, the 
Plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees, based upon the Earnest Money Agreement must also 
fail. Bodenhauser v. Patterson, 563 P2d 1212 (Oregon 1977) held that a successful suit 
for recision of a contract ordinarily includes the recision of the provisions for attorney's 
fees contained in the contract. 
In a similar vein, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that where the defendant 
successfully defendant an action brought under an Earnest Money Agreement and for 
damages arising out of breach of representations in the Earnest Money Agreement by 
claiming that there was a novation when the land sales contract was completed, the 
defendant was not entided to attorney's fees under the Earnest Money Agreement which 
was no longer in existence and was not enforceable. Witt v. Keller Roeheich, 800 P2d 781 
(Oregon App. 1990). 
Whether it's a novation under Oregon Law, a merger under Utah law, the net effect 
is the same, i.e., the Earnest Money is no longer in existence and neither party can rely on 
its provisions for all award for attorney's fees. 
Moreover, the language of the Earnest Money Agreement principally deals with the 
default of the Buyer and Seller's remedies and default of the Seller and Seller's remedies. 
(Para. H, Earnest Money Agreement, Stipulated Exh. 15). Addendum 21 
Maynard v. Wharton, Supra is dispositive as to any award of attorney's fees to the 
Seller under an Earnest Money Agreement. 
The Buyer brought suit under the Earnest Money Agreement alleging breach of 
contract, negligent representation and fraud arising from their purchase of real estate from 
the Sellers. 
The Utah Court of Appeals applied the merger doctrine and affirmed the trial court 
in its findings that no fraud was proven. 
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More importantly, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's award of 
attorney's fees to the sellers. 
"Parties seeking an award of attorney's fees under contract must establish that the 
contract's term anticipated such an award". Maynard v. Wharton, Supra, p. 37. Emphasis 
mine. 
The only basis for attorney's fees upon which the sellers rely is Paragraph "H' of 
the Earnest Money Agreement Maynard v. Wharton, supra, p. 38. Similarly, in the 
instant case, paragraph H is the sole basis for Ohs attorney's fees. Paragraph H in both 
cases are identical. 
The Wharton Court stated that paragraph H "requires those seeking an award of 
attorney's fees to show that the other party defaulted at least one of the covenants or 
agreements of the Earnest Money Agreement", at page 38. 
The Court further states that "sellers did not point to any express warranties, 
covenants, or agreement on which the buyers defaulted; therefore, the sellers cannot invoke 
paragraph "h" as a basis for an award of attorney's fees", page 38. 
"Paragraph H has its limits; it does not award attorney's fees to prevailing parties in 
every lawsuit related to Earnest Money Agreement. In short, paragraph "H" does not 
contemplate an award of attorney's fees for sellers just because the buyer sued". See Carr 
v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P2d 2392, 1296 (Utah App. 1995) holding buyers election of 
remedies under the Earnest Money Agreement was not a default that entitled sellers to 
attorney's fees", at p. 38. 
Carr v. Enoch Smith Company, 781 P2d 1292 (Utah App. 1989). The Utah Court 
of Appeals reversed the trial court's award of attorney's fees for the defendant because the 
defendant took a defensive position in the suit involving specific performance under an 
Earnest Money Agreement, i.e.; the plaintiff failed to tender his own performance, 
therefore there was no contract. 'There was no enforcing any rights under the Agreement 
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(Earnest Money Agreement) or arising from the breach thereof as required by the specific 
terms of the Earnest Money Agreement, (emphasis mine) 
It was never alleged or sought to be proved that Satsudas, in any way, defaulted in 
any of the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
TO THE OHS WHEN THE OHS FAILED TO ALLOCATE THE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED FOR DEFENDING SATSUDAS', 
ASSUMING THERE IS A CONTRACTUAL BASIS FOR SUCH AN 
AWARD. 
The records reflect that Ohs' attorney divided their time in two activities: (1) The 
defense of Satsudas' claim and (2) prosecution of their claim against the Urns. 
The trial court expressed its concerns stating "I am somewhat concerned, given the 
identity...essential identity of their case between the defendants and third party defendants 
as that there not be a duplication in claimed fees to be paid here/' (R.O.A.; Transcript of 
Judge's Ruling. (R.O.A. 2229, p. 8) Addendum 5. 
In Cottonwood Mall Company vs. Sine, 830 P2d 2d 266 (Utah 1992), Utah 
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Howe, reversed and remanded the trial court's 
order on attorney's fees where the proponent failed to distinguish between the work done 
that was subject to a fee award and work that was not, p. 269, stating: 
"One who seeks an award of attorney's fees must set out the time and fees 
expended for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entidement to attorney's fees 
(2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entidement to attorney's fees 
had the claim been successful and (3) claims for which there is no entidement to attorney's 
fees". Citation omitted, page 271. 
In Schafir v. Hannigan, Supra, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
denial of seller's attorney's fees because the seller's motion for attorneys fees stemmed 
from the Earnest Money Agreement and "any fees or costs uniquely applicable to the 
(contractual) warranties are insignificant", page 1393. 
In Selvage v. 7. 7. Johnson, Infra, p. 15, the Court of Appeals states that it may be 
proper to deny a request for attorney's fees if the requesting party fails to allocate in 
accordance with the directive of Cottonwood Mall, such a decision is within the trial court's 
discretion, rather than being a strict legal mandate. 
Nevertheless, the appellant urges this Court to deny the attorney's fees for Ohs on 
the directive announced in the Cottonwood Mall case. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE SUFFICIENT 
FINDING TO SUPPORT AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND THE 
FINDING MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
Ohs and Urns' attorneys' fees were presumably based upon contract. There is no 
specificity as to which contract or contract provision, and findings does not reflect any facts 
relied upon by the trial court. (R.O.A. V4, 1715-1718) 
'The Trial Court must consider certain factors and make findings of fact supports 
its conclusions. Utah Appellate Courts have consistently encouraged the Trial Court to 
make findings and explain the factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an 
attorney's fee award. Selvage v. 7. 7. Johnson & Associates, 282 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 
(Utah App. Jan. 1996), citation omitted. Cottonwood Mall Co, Supra. 
There are no facts to support the conclusion, Paragraph 12, First Amendment 
Findings of Fact (R.O.A. 001713), which reads: 
'Third party defendants fees is a necessary step taken by the defendants to defend 
the complaint and the dismissal of third party plaintiff is a result of the dismissal of the 
complaint" 
Consequendy, the trial court finds and concludes that third party attorney's fees are 
to be passed through to as awarded directly against the plaintiff." 
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The record reflects the following: 
1. Third party complaint was the sole decision of defendants. 
2. Ums are not a necessary party or an indispensable party under Rule 19. 
(R.O.A. VI, P100046), Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
3. Satsudas had a telephone conversation with Um who corroborated the 
conversation, prior to the commencement of the action wherein Ums reported to Satsudas 
that he (Um) disclosed to Ohs that the five additional rooms had been built without a 
building permit (R.O.A., V3, P001192). 
This was consistent with Mr. Urn's testimony at trial. (R.O.A. Tr. 162). Based 
upon that representation from Um, Satsuda concluded that Ums should not be named as a 
co-defendant but a witness in behalf of the Satsudas, contrary to the trial court's remark 
that a "better posture of the case may well have been to name the third party defendants as 
defendants in that this issue (attorney's fees) was not as confused as it is." (R.O.A., 
Judge's Ruling, 002231, Tr. 8). Addendum 5. 
4. Satsudas cannot be held responsible for independent action of the Ohs to file a 
third party complaint since the conflict between Satsudas and Ohs could well have been 
resolved without Ums as a party, but as a witness. 
5. It is contradictory in terms to have the trial court deny the Rule 19 motion and 
find that the third party attorney's fees is a necessary step taken by the defendant to 
defendant the complaint. 
5. There is no findings of negligence or breach of contract by the Satsudas. 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
The real estate contract between the Ohs and Ums, dated May 1, 1989, contains the 
following pertinent language regarding attorney's fees. It reads: (Stip. Exh. 1) 
"15. Attorney's Fees: Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of 
the covenants or agreements herein contained, the non-defaulting party, or should litigation 
be commenced, the prevailing party in litigation, shall be entitled to all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or 
terminating this contract, or in obtaining possession of the Property, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law. 
Paragraph 16, Buyer default would not be applicable since at no time was alleged or 
proven that Satsudas or Ums were in default of the payments. In fact, Satsudas was 
required and did make the Ums payments directly to Ums under the Assignment of 
Contract, dated January 5, 1990, between Satsudas as assignees and Ohs as assignors. 
(Stip. Exh., L8) 
It is clear that Satsudas were not a party to the Real Estate Contract between the Ohs 
and Ums; thus it is equally clear that the entitlement of Ohs' attorney's fees against the 
Satsuda cannot arise from the explicit terms of the real estate contract, except as may be 
construed through the Assignment of the Real Estate contract between Satsudas and Ohs. 
(Stip. Fact, #81.) The pertinent language of the assignment reads: 
"2. That in consideration of the assignors executing and delivering this agreement, 
the assignees covenant with the assignors as follows: 
a. That the assignees will duly keep, observe and perform all of the terms, 
conditions and provisions of the said agreement that are to be kept, observed and 
performed by the assignors. 
b. That the assignees will save and hold harmless the assignors of and from any 
and all Actions, suits, costs, damages, claims and demands whatsoever arising by reason of 
an act or omission of the assignees. 
The trial court did not enter any findings that Satsudas, as assignees, failed to keep, 
observe and perform the terms, conditions and provisions of agreement (real estate 
contract). Parenthesis mine. Nor do the facts establish any act or omission by Assignees 
(Satsudas) which would trigger the hold harmless clause of the assignment. Nor did either 
Ohs or Ums point to any defaults of the assignment as basis for attorney's fees for their 
attorneys. Ohs present the "pass through" theory to inflict Ums' attorney's fees upon 
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Satsudas. Ums present a violation of the assignment as a contractual basis, stating that 
Satsudas' act of filing the proceeding comes within the wording of the assignment. 
The procedural aspects needs to be addressed at this point to emphasize that Ohs 
made the decision to file a third party complaint against the Ums. 
Ums were not a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19, URCP and the 
trial court so ruled in response to Ohs' Motion to Dismiss for failure to join Ums, as 
necessary or indispensable party. (R.O.A. VI, page 045, 046.) 
Oh filed the third party complaint against the Ums alleging substantially the same cause of 
action alleged by Satsudas and addressing claims for identification and unjust enrichment. 
(R.O.A.,Vl,page056) 
Ohs third party complaint alleged only the Earnest Money Agreement between him 
and Ums as a contract claim in his third party complaint. This was acknowledged by the 
Ums in their trial brief. 
"It should be noted that there is no allegation of negligence in any of the causes 
raised, by only contract and intentional torts, and only the earnest money or an unstated 
contract obligation is relied upon, and nowhere is the subsequent uniform real estate 
contract either relied upon or was acknowledged." (Third Party Defendant's trial brief, 
R.O.A. V3, P. 1315-1319). 
Although, not expressly acknowledged, Ohs' trial brief made reference to the 
Earnest Money Agreement between Satsudas and Ohs as the only contract claim. (R.O.A. 
VI, 1195-1255). It is noteworthy to state that the abrogation clause of the Earnest Money 
Agreement is identical to Maynard v. Wharton, Supra, and contains an "as is" clause. 
The merger doctrine effectively eliminates the Earnest Money Agreement and, with 
it, any basis for a contractual award of attorney's fees. Maynard v. Wharton, Supra. 
The balance of Satsudas' claims sound in tort, i.e., good faith dealing and 
misrepresentation, upon which no contractual basis for attorney's fees exists. 
The award of attorney's fees must first be analyzed as between Ohs and Urns 
before the hold harmless clause may be deemed a contractual basis for an award of 
attorney's fees. 
Satsudas, were never in default on the Real Estate Contract, nor was there any 
finding made to indicate Satsudas' non-performance. In fact, Satsudas had completely 
performed their obligations under the Real Estate Contract as requested in the Assignment 
of Contract.. 
Thus, given the rule that attorney's fees would only be awarded stricdy in 
accordance with contract, there exists no legal basis for an award of attorney's fees to either 
Ohs or Urns. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO OHS AND UMS UNDER THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
ASSUMING THAT THE REAL ESTATE WAS THE CONTRACTUAL 
BASIS. 
The reasoning used in Maynard v. Wharton , Supra, is equally applicable as 
entidement of attorney's fees under the Real Estate Contract, i.e., attorney's fees should 
only be recoverable by the prevailing parties, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or 
terminating this contract, or in obtaining possession of the property or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law. 
Urns do not purport that their attorney's fees come within the language of the Real 
Estate Contract nor do they state that any of the attorney's fees were employed in 
accordance with Paragraph 15 of the Real Estate Contract. 
BUT Investment Company v. Snow, 586 P2d 456 (Utah 1978) illustrates Utah's 
strict adherence contract basis for attorney's fees and awards of attorney's fees stricdy in 
accordance therewith. 
BUT Investment Company case involved an action for rescission. BLT was 
granted a rescission and attorney's fees by the trial court. 
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Utah Supreme Court affirmed the rescission but reversed the trial court's award of 
attorney's fees stating "Rescission extinguishes the contract" so effectually" that it "never 
had any existence". P. 458. Court cites Bodenhauser v. Patterson,, 278 Or. 366, 563 P2d 
1212 (1977). 
Bliss v. Anderson, 585 P2d 29 (1987) another Oregon case, Court of Appeals 
ruled that a suit to recover arrearages arising from fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation 
made in the negotiations of the sale of a restaurant was a "suit in tort rather than a suit "to 
enforce the provisions of the contract". 
Stubbs v. Hemment, 567 P2d 168 (Ut. 1977) again illustrates the strict adherence 
to contractual terms existing between the parties before awarding attorney's fees and the 
disallowance of attorney's fees not within the terms of the contract. 
In the Stubbs case, plaintiff brought an action for foreclosure. The defendant 
counterclaimed for wrongful removal of property from the building. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the attorney's fees for foreclosure action and the trial court's reduction of 
attorney's fees by eliminating the fees on the "negotiation and defense of the counterclaim". 
P. 171 
Dick v. American National Mortgage, 510 P2d 1096 (Ut. 1973). The Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the vendors against the vendee's 
claim of settlement of interest on vendee's payment to vendor's predecessor in interest. 
More germane to the instant case is the fact that the Dick Court denied the vendor's 
request for attorney's fees where the vendor had not breached the uniform real estate 
contract. (Italics mine). 
If attorney's fees are recoverable by contract, "{a) party is entitled to only those 
fees attributable to the successful vindication of the contractual rights within the terms of 
the agreement". Troyer v. Cushing, 688 P2d 856, 858, (Utah 1984) cited in Stacy 
Properties v. Wixen, 766 P2d 1060 (Utah. App. 1988). 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
TO UMS AGAINST THE SATSUDAS IN THAT THERE WAS NO 
CONTRACTUAL BASIS FOR THE SAME AND A PASS THROUGH 
THEORY IS NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS NO BREACH OF 
CONTRACT OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE SATSUDAS. 
The trial court's ruling as to the award of attorney's fees for the Urns is confusing. 
The trial court's verbal announcement as to attorney's fees states that "reasonable 
attorney's fees are awarded to the defendants and third party defendants, the amount of 
which is to be determined by submission of affidavits. (R.O.A., Judge's ruling, Tr. 7, 
L23; 8, Ll-2). Addendum 5. 
In response to plaintiffs' counsel, the court states: 
"The Court: It's pursuant to the contract, at least at this stage. I am not committed 
in concrete Mr. Mitsunaga, to making the award. My notion is that if there is a legitimate 
basis, I presumed that there was because all of you requested them during the trial, if there 
is a legitimate basis for the award of attorney's fees, then I will make a determination as to 
reasonableness thereof and to whom they're to be awarded. However, if there is a contest 
as to the appropriateness of any award, then that may be addressed in the 4-501 
application. 
Mr. Mitsunaga: Okay, so that the Court is saying there's still an issue as to the 
entitlement and then after entitlement, the amount. 
The Court: I'm saying that while I am ruling that fees are awardable to the 
defendants and the third party defendants, that's based simply upon the fact that everybody 
in this case sought them during the course of the trial and I therefore assumed that there 
was a provision providing for the same. If there's a dispute to that, then that can be 
addressed in the application under 4-501 for a determination of reasonableness. 
Mr. Mitsunaga: Okay. That deals with the threshold issue of entitlement. 
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The Court: I'm not precluding you from claiming that they're not entitled. That's 
my point. 
Mr. Mitsunaga: Okay. 
The Court: All right. If there's nothing further, counsel, we'll be in recess." 
Thus the Trial Court makes some vague reference as to the basis for awarding 
attorney's fees, i.e., "I assume that there was a provision providing for the same". 
One thing is clear. The issue of entitlement was reserved at that point. 
The minute entry, dated April 18, 1995 states that the Court is unable to rule on the 
reasonableness of the claimed fees of the third party defendants as no detailed analysis for 
"pass through" purpose is on file. (R.O.A. 1626-1627) Addendum 6 
The Findings of Fact reflects the trial court's language which states that the "third 
party defendant's entidement to attorney's fees and liability therefore, if awarded, are 
reserved for further proceeding." (R.O.A. 001644, p. 10) Addendum 7-8. 
The Order denies the third party's application for attorney's fees without prejudice. 
(R.O.A. 001657) Addendum 7-8. 
Satsudas filed an objection on May 1, 1995 stating that the Findings of Fact failed 
to state which particular contract upon which the attorney's fees award are based. (R.O.A. 
001636) and that the Trial Court's prior minute entry on April 18, 1995, was tantamount to 
a denial of the third party's attorney's fees as against Satsudas. 
The trial court's minute entry on May 9, 1995 states that court is persuaded that the 
third party defendants are entided to be paid by the plaintiff. (R.O.A 0001669) Addendum 
11. 
The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was signed by the trial 
court on June 9, 1995 and the Conclusions of Law awarded the third party defendants 
attorney's fees. :"At this time subject to further proceedings concerning the amount to be 
awarded". (R.O.A. 001704) Addendum 12. 
The Order concludes that the third party defendants case was and "is a necessary 
step taken by the defendants to defend the complaint"...Third party defendant's attorney's 
fees are to be passed through to and awarded directly against the plaintiff. (R.O.A. 
001713, P. 20. (Italics mine) 
The third party defendants filed a reply to plaintiffs Objection to the Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 8, 1995 (R.O.A. 001693), primarily 
admitting that "they can find no provision in contract (real estate contract or other 
agreements between the parties which allows recovery of their fees against the plaintiff 
unless and until they are first determined to be a cost or claim properly assessed against the 
defendants". (R.O.A. 1695) (Emphasis mine) Addendum 13. 
Thus, the Urns needed "at least a finding that they attorney's fees were necessarily 
and reasonably incurred to defend against Ohs' action against them". (R.O.A. 001695) 
Presumably, the Urns rely upon paragraph 3b of the Assignment of Contract. 
Thereafter a Supplemental Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal was entered o n 
July 6, 1995 (R.O.A. 2795-99), reciting that the basis of the attorney's fees arises from 
Paragraph 3b of the Assignment of the Real Estate Contract and that the third party costs 
and attorney's fees are necessary and reasonably incurred to defend against the defendants 
third party action and were "costs, claims and demands upon defendants, arising by reason 
of an act or omission of the plaintiff, to-wit: initiating the instant action and requirement of 
a commencement of a third party action. (R.O.A. 001795) The defendants, however, rely 
in the application for the "pass through" theory on Urns' attorney's fees. They do not 
claim they are responsible for Urns' attorney's fees arising from the Real Estate Contract. 
The trial court again changed the basis for the award of attorney's fees from the 
"pass through" which is not contractual, but is awardable arising from a breach of a 
contractual obligation when attorney's fees were reasonably foreseeable an consequential 
damages. Collier v. Heinz, 827 P2d 982 (Ut. App. 1992) or awardable under the third 
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party tort rule, South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P2d 1279 (Ut. App. 1980) to a 
contractual basis, i.e., paragraph 3b of the Assignment of Real Estate Contract. 
In view of the wording of the trial court in the Supplemental Findings, the 
Appellants do not address the "pass through" theory of attorney's fees, except to reiterate 
that the same would not be applicable for reasons set forth in Collier and South Sanpitch 
Co. and Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur. 854 P2d 523 (Ut. 1993). South Sanpete Co., 
also contains the following admonition: 
uOf course, care must be taken in cases like this to insure not only that the 
attorney's fees are otherwise properly calculated, e.g., Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 
P2d 985 (Utah 1988), but also that an allocation is made between recoverable fees incurred 
in litigation with third parties and non-recoverable fees incurred in pursuing the negligent 
defendant or expended in a cause of action not proximately necessitated by that defendant's 
negligence"., Page 283. 
Whereas the pass through theory of attorney's fees on the third party action may 
(without conceding) permit Ohs' attorney's fees; it is too far reaching to state the "pass 
through" theory would subject Satsudas to Urns' attorney's fees. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED UPON PARAGRAPH 3B OF 
THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
The defendants, in its third party complaint, never requested third party attorney's 
fees as an element of costs. Moreover, the defendants, in filing their affidavit for 
attorney's fees does not list on "costs" which include third party defendant's attorney's 
fees. The thrust of their basis for attorney's fees comes from Collier v. Heinz, (R.O.A. 
1484). 
Under the Real Estate Contract, paragraph 15, the Ohs would be obligated to Urns 
attorney's fees under the prevailing party concept. Paragraph 15 must be read in its entirely 
and if so read would require the following: 
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a. Default by either party in any of the covenants and agreements herein contained. 
b. Litigation be commenced (regarding default by either party). 
c. Prevailing parties in litigation shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees 
d. which may arise or be incurred 
e. from enforcing or terminating the contract or 
f. in obtaining possession of the party. 
g. or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder. 
Neither the Ohs nor the Urns make the claim that their attorney's fees fall within 
paragraph 15 or submitted any facts that their attorney's fees were incurred pursuing any 
remedy provided in the Real Estate Contract. 
"In order to recover all of his requested attorney's fees, Selvage must demonstrate 
that there is either a contractual or statutory authorization for such an award". Selvage v. J. 
7. Johnson & Associates, 282 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, filed January 19, 1996). 
However, as stated, a careful reading of the paragraph 15 in its entire context would 
not include any litigation arising between the parties (Ohs and Urns) but must be limited to 
litigation arising from the four corners of the Real Estate Contract. 
It is unlikely that a Court would award either party, prevailing party attorney's fees 
in a personal injury action between them. Yet, the defendants would have the Court so 
hold. Defendants reply to the Memorandum in Support of Verified Application of 
Attorney's fees. (R.O.A. 1583, 1591) 
Third party defendants agree in principle with the appellant's position. Third party 
defendant reply to Plaintiffs Objections. (R.O.A. 1695, p. 3). 
THE ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT, PARAGRAPH B3 DOES NOT 
PROVIDE A LEGAL BASIS FOR AWARD OF UMS' ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Paragraph 3a requires that Satsudas, as assignees, keep, observe and perform all of 
the terms, conditions and provisions of the Agreement (Real Estate Contract) that are to be 
kept, observed and performed by the Assignors. 
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Paragraph 3b must be read in conjunction with the duties assumed by Satsudas in 
paragraph 3a and in doing so, it is apparent that any acts or omissions by the Satsudas must 
fall within the acts or omission or the duties he is bound to perform; thus triggering the 
hold harmless portion of paragraph 3b. Any other construction of paragraph 3b would lead 
to disastrous and even ridiculous scenarios, never contemplated by the parties or the Court. 
Maynard v. Wharton, Supra; Carr v. Enoch Smith Co,, Supra. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE OHS> 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS REASONABLE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
FINDINGS NECESSARY TO ARRIVE AT LEGAL CONCLUSION. 
THUS, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION. 
Generally, the trial court's award of attorney's fees will be affirmed absent an abuse 
of discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, Supra. Further, the reasonableness of the 
amount of attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jenkins v. 
Bailey, 676 P2d 391 (Utah 1984). 
The trial court award must be based upon and supported by the evidence in the 
record. These factors include the difficulty of the issues involved, reasonableness of time 
spent, fees charged in the locality for similar services, and the necessity of bringing an 
action to vindicate rights. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P2d 1188 (Utah 1993). 
Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P2d 574 (Ut. App. 1991) and case cited therein, stands for 
the proposition that "attorney's fees should be awarded on the basis of evidence and 
findings of fact should be made which support the award." Cabrerra v. Cotttrell, 694 P2d 
622 (Utah 1985). This court has reversed attorney's fees awards when the trial court failed 
to make appropriate findings and conclusions of law. See e.g. Matter of Estate of Grimm, 
784 P2d 1238-1249, (Utah App. 1989). ("The absence in record before us of findings and 
conclusion as the issue of attorney's fees compels remand to the trial court to correct that 
deficiency in the record). Cert denied, 795 P2d 1138 (Utah 1990)." 
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In the instant case, there are no facts recited to support the reasonableness of the 
Ohs? attorney's fees. 
Moreover, as stated earlier, the failure of the Ohs to allocate their attorney's fees 
between the defense of Satsudas' claim and prosecution of Ohs' claim against Satsudas as 
the failure of the trial court to require the allocation is fatal to Ohs' claim for attorney's fees. 
This issue is also germane to Urns' attorney's fees' claim for attorney's fees. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE 
MERGER DOCTRINE WHERE THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
PROVIDES FOR EXISTENCE OF COLLATERAL RIGHTS. 
Satsudas and Ohs entered into an Earnest Money Agreement dated November 16, 
1989. (Stip. Trial Exh. 14) Addendum 21. 
The terms of the Earnest Money Agreement are not similar to Maynard v. 
Wharton's Earnest Money Agreement. 
The appellants contends that there are two provisions in the instant Earnest Money 
Agreement that survive the merger doctrine; each of the provisions providing for collateral 
rights which survive the execution and delivery of the deed by the Seller. 
The first is the express warranty clause, found in paragraph C (a) stating that 
Sellers has received no claims or notice of any building or zoning violations concerning the 
property which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing and C (c) the plumbing, 
heating, air conditioning and ventilation systems, electrical systems and appliances shall be 
in sound and satisfactory working order. 
Paragraph O, Abrogation: Except for express warranties under this Agreement, 
execution and delivery of the final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement. (Itahcs 
mine) 
The instant abrogation clause differs from the abrogation clause found in Schafir v. 
Harrigan ,849 P2d 1384, (Ut. App. 1994) and Secor v. Knight, 716 P2d 790, 792 (Ut. 
1986) in that the abrogation in Schafir case stated: "Execution of the final Real Estate 
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Contract, if any, shall abrogate this Agreement/' P, 1392. There was no express 
reservation as to express warranties. 
The Earnest Money Agreement between the Ohs and Urns, dated February 28, 
1987, contains the same language found in the Schafir and Secor cases. 
At trial, through stipulated facts, the following was established: 
1. Larry Suggars, Salt Lake City Building Inspector, discovered and found the 
deficiencies which he set forth in the Notice of Deficiencies dated June 31, 1990, post 
marked February 12, 1990. 
2. The Notice of Deficiencies noted were the building, electrical and plumbing. 
(Stip.Trial Exh. 15.) Addendum 23. 
More particularly, Units 1 through 7 were converted into cooking facilities without 
conforming to electrical and plumbing requirements and must be brought up to code. 
Units 0 and 34 through 40 were added without conforming with plumbing and 
electrical requirement 
Other listed deficiencies relating to Unit 0 through 7 and 34 through 40 stated improper 
ventilation, smoke detector lacking, electrical hazards and weakening wall. Also, Room 35 
was permanently closed because there was no approved window or exterior door for 
emergency escape or rescue. 
Appellants contend the trial court completely ignored the express warranties in 
reaching its decision on the merger doctrine. This is an error at law. 
Not only does the express warranties claim survive the merger doctrine, but also 
paragraph e of the Earnest Money Agreement states: 
(e) Buyer Inspection, buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and 
subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present condition, except: 
buyer will inspect more units before acceptance and it should be all operational condition. 
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Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P2d 168 (Utah 1977), held that clause that Seller remove 
from the building "All equipment and shelving, except the "two walk in coolers with their 
equipment" survived the merger doctrine. 
The Stubbs' Court, after set forth the doctrine of merger, states: 
{2.3} However, if the original contract calls for performance by the seller of some 
act, collateral to conveyance of title, his obligations with respect thereto survive the deed 
and are not extinguished by it. Whether the terms of the contract are collateral, or are part 
of the obligation to convey and therefore unenforceable after delivery of the deed, depends 
to a great extent on the intent of the parties with respect thereto. When seller's performance 
is intended by the parties to take place at some time after the delivery of the deed it cannot 
be said that it was contemplated by the parties that delivery of the deed would constitute full 
performance on the part of the seller, absent some manifest intent to the contrary. (Italics 
mine) 
The intent of the Satsudas was that the motel would be a turn-key operation. 
(R.O.A. Tr. 23) and there is no question that Ohs were selling and Satsudas were 
purchasing forty (40) rentable units. 
The Earnest Money Agreement was prepared by Mr. Kim who assisted Ohs in the 
sale of the motel. (R.O.A. Tr. 225) 
Ohs permitted Satsudas to commence operating the motel five days before the 
closing. (Stip. Fact, V3, p. 01190) . Regardless of whether Ohs were aware of the 
deficiencies, the deficiencies were in fact recorded and constituted a violation of the express 
warranties. 
Ales v. Merrit v. Ales, 486 N. W. 2d 592 (Iowa, App. 1992), states: "Seller 
warrants that the heating and air conditioning systems, plumbing and electrical systems, all 
appliances, and all other mechanical equipment included as part of the purchase price, will 
be in working order as of the date of possession, with the following exceptions: 
McNamura wrote in "No exceptions", Page 593.. 
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(7) We next address the question of whether the plumbing system, which did not 
meet code standards, could be considered to be in working order. We conclude the 
plumbing system was not in working order. The Scott County Health Department required 
the system to be reconstructed to provide proper sewage treatment and disposal. The 
system which was in place did not properly treat or dispose of sewage and thus could not 
be said to be in working order". 
Fleiserv. Lettion, 557 N.E. 2d 383 (111. 1 Dist. 1990) 
"In an action for fraud, one of the issue deal with whether the electrical system was in 
'good working order.' The Illinois court stated where the vendors (home sale) agreed that 
the mechanical, electrical, plumbing, heating, cooling system and appliances were in good 
working order and would be maintained in that condition to the date of possession, 'good 
working order' did not mean only that the specific system were in good working order to 
the last of vendor's knowledge". 
The appellant Court disagreed with the trial court's ruling that an electrical system in 
a house is in 'good working order' mainly if all the lights worked. Rather, to be in good 
working order, we believe that it is necessary that there be no major defects in or problems 
with the underlying wiring in that system", (emphasis ours) P. 390. 
Defendants take great pains to establish that Oh was not made aware of any code 
violations, apparently to dispel the notion that Ohs may have breached paragraph c of the 
Earnest Money Agreement. 
However, as noted above, the Express Warranties , Paragraph C(c) states the 
plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilation system, electrical system and appliances 
be in sound and satisfactory working condition at closing. Ohs' awareness is not relevant 
to violation of express warranties. 
The subject rooms lacked "sound and working conditions", especially regarding 
plumbing and electrical system. Room 35 lacked any legal ventilation. 
33 
Should the Court rule the Express Warranties survive the merger doctrine and that 
there is a breach of the Express Warranties, the appellants would be entided to reasonable 
attorney's fees on the Earnest Money Agreement, to include attorney's fees at trial and on 
appeal. Rosenlofv. Sullivan, 676 P2d 372 (UT. 1983). 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING SATSUDAS 
COSTS OF CORRECTING THE ELECTRICAL AND PLUMBING 
DEFICIENCIES. 
The evidence is undisputed that Satsudas, upon receiving the Notice of Deficiency, 
took measures to correct the same. 
Satsudas, at a minimum incurred out of repairs for rooms 1 through 6 in the amount 
of $13,621.00. Further, Satsudas incurred costs of $23,660.00 for restoration of Rooms 
0, 7, 35 to 39 which was completed in March of 1991. 
In this connection and as a corollary to the Satsudas claim for damages, the 
appellants states that the trial court's Order granting Ohs' partial summary judgment was in 
error as a matter of law. 
Essentially, Satsudas claimed two measures of damages. One, loss of the benefit 
of the bargain rule and two, out of pocket expenses incurred in correcting the deficiencies. 
(R.O.A. VI, 00002, Plaintiffs complaint; Paragraphs 22 and 23) Addendum 1. 
The trial court ordered a partial summary of judgment on the issue of damages 
(R.O.A. VI, P. 905-907). The Order, reduced in substance, relies on the fact that 
Satsudas sold the motel in January, 1994 for $860,000.00, a sum that is $260,000.00 
greater than the purchase price from Ohs. (Stip. Fact, V3, 1184,1193) thereby limiting 
plaintiffs damage to $1.00 if they prevail.. 
There was a dispute as to the measure of damages in the sense that Ohs claim that 
Satsudas sold the motel four years after they purchased it at a higher price establishes that 
the value of the motel at the time of the breach (January, 1990) as being in excess of the 
34 
purchase price paid by the Satsudas ($620,000.00); therefore, the contractual damages of 
benefit of the bargain does not apply. 
No affidavits were submitted by Ohs to support this assertion and since no affidavit 
was submitted, the Satsudas did not submit counter-affidavits. 
One stipulated fact is clear. Satsudas did expend at least $37,281.00 to cure the 
deficiencies arising from the Ohs' violation of the express warranties contained in 
Paragraph (c) of the Earnest Money Agreement. 
The trial court's reliance on Soffe v. Ridd , 659 P2d 1082 (UT 1983) case is 
misplaced. This case dealt with the vendor attempting to retain the amounts paid 
($20,725.00) under a real estate contract. 
In a forfeiture proceeding, the Seller incurred loss of fair rental value as "well as 
costs of cleaning, repairs, labor, fire insurance, title insurance and sewer fee", P. 1083. 
The trial court offset the actual damage ($5,895.50) against the buyer payment 
($20,725.00) and awarded the buyer a judgment for $14,829.50 and accrued interest on 
buyer's counterclaim. The trial court did not allow the sellers benefit of the bargain 
damages because the seller failed to produce evidence that the property had diminished in 
value and to the contrary, there is evidence that the property had increased in value above 
the initial contract price. The general rule in Real Estate Contract is that fair market value 
should be determined at the time of the breach, Bellon v. Melnor, infra, P. 1094. 
Thus, whereas the sellers were not awarded any damages under the benefit of the 
bargain rule, they were nevertheless awarded some damage. The case would stand for the 
proposition that a loss of benefit of bargain damages does not preclude the award of the 
proven damages, such as costs of cleaning, repairs, labors, etc.. 
Similarly, Bellon v. Melmar, 808 P2d 1089 (Utah 1991) does not exclude other 
damages when the benefit of the bargain rule is ruled out because of the appreciation of 
subject property. The Bellon Court affirmed the award of $1,774.52 delinquent taxes and 
other damages totaling $50,132.03 while denying the sellers any damage for benefit and 
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the bargain because the subject property increased in value. Again, the loss of benefit of 
bargain rule does not preclude the other damages other than nominal damages. 
Harris v. Shell Development, 594 P2d 731 (Nev. 1979), the Nevada Supreme 
Court ruled that where the market value of the land at the time of the purchaser's breach 
was higher than the purchase price, the vendor is only entided to nominal damages plus 
proved consequential damages which includes recovery of out of pocket expenses, 
including an approval and other miscellaneous items foreseeable at inception of the 
contract. The Court affirmed the award of $4,369.34, plus $535.00 attorney's fees in 
consequential damages. 
This Court should rule that the trial court's ruling is incorrect and afford no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
THE COURT ERRED NOT FINDING FRAUD ON THE PART OF 
THE OHS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND COMPLETION OF THE SALE 
OF THE CAPITOL MOTEL. 
The standard for review is that clearly erroneous standard, Aha Indust. LTD v. 
Hurst, 846 P2d 1281 (Utah 1993). 
The Court's findings of fact would be clearly erroneous if they are lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P2d 1176 
(Utah 1989). 
Appellant must marshall evidence in the support of the findings and the 
demonstration that despite the evidence, the Court's finding is lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P2d 
1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). 
Stipulated Facts, R.O.A. V3, 1184-1194 needs to be examined Addendum 3. 
Reference with to be made to the Stipulated Facts (Stip. Facts) and Findings of 
Facts. (F o F). 
Mr. Urn purchased the Capitol Motel in 1982. (F o F V3, V4,1644-1654). 
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Mr. Um made various repairs to the motel in 1983 to bring it up to code suitable 
for occupancy. In doing so, he got and passed inspection, largely performed by the Salt 
Lake City Health Department. (Stip. Exh. 2). 
Other inspections by the Fire Department also were approved. (Stip. Exh. 2). 
In 1984, the addition of six additional units were completed without a building 
permit from Salt Lake City and giving the motel a forty (40) unit rental capacity. (Stip. 
Facts, V3, 1186, paragraph 12, 13.) 
Mr. Um knew that the additional rooms were built without a building permit; he did 
not instruct his contractor to obtain a permit. (Stip. Facts, V3 1186, para. 14). 
The motel passed the health and building fire inspection until February, 1990. when 
Larry Suggars inspected the motel and filed the Notice of Deficiencies. (Stip. Exh. #15). 
Urns represented to Ohs that it was a 40 unit motel. (Stip. Facts, V3 1190). 
Mr. Um advised Oh on a couple of occasions that Urns had "added" five or six 
rooms to the motel without a building permit. (Tr. P. 158; R.O.A. 002100, L.22-25; Tr. 
p. 259, R.O.A. 002101, L 2) 
Mr. Um represented to Ohs that forty (40) rooms were available for rent as he was 
operating the motel as a 40 unit operation. (Stip. Facts. 4, R.O.A. V3, 1187, para. 28). 
In the years of Urns' operations, they consistendy reported a 34 room on the annual 
license application. (Stip. Facts, para. 7 V3, 1187; para 18; F of F, para 7; R.O.A. 1644-
1654). 
This 34 room reporting apparendy was to the economic advantage to Urns and to 
the Ohs since the license fee is great for a forty (40) unit motel than a thirty-four (34) unit 
Motel. (Stip. Facts, para. 8, R.O.A. 1187, F of F, para. 8) 
The Urns reported income for a forty (40) unit motel as did the Ohs report to 
Satsudas the income from a forty (40) unit motel. (Stip. Facts, V3, 1190). 
Other facts will be brought out in argument. 
The elements of fraud are clearly established in a number of Utah cases. 
37 
'The full measure of the plaintiffs duty was the use of reasonable care and 
observation in connection with these representations. Having done so, it does not he with" 
the defendant's mouth to say that they were too gullible and shouldn't have believed him. 
Tr. 276. 
Smith v. Pearman, 548 P2d (Utah 1976). Purchaser brought action for rescission 
on a contract for sale of duplex apartment. 
The property was listed by the real estate agent.. It was being used as a duplex. 
The property was listed in a newspaper as a duplex and as a valuable asset in assessing the 
sale price. 
The apartment was subsequendy found to be in violation of local zoning ordinances 
and the tenants were notified by the city to vacate the property. 
Justice Henroid upheld the trial court's order to rescind the contract for sale of the 
property, notwithstanding the fact the parties did not realize the apartment was in violation 
of the zoning ordinance and that no bad faith was alleged. 
Elder v. Clawson of Tuttle Realty, 802 Utah (1963). In an action for rescission, 
the Utah Supreme Court states that fraud may be committed by suppression of the truth as 
well as suggestion of falsehood. Silence must relate to a material fact known to the party 
and which it is the legal duty to communicate to the other contracting party, whether the 
duty arises from a relationship of trust, from confidence, inequality of condition and 
knowledge or other attendant circumstances. P. 804. 
The Court affirmed the rescission in the Elder case and points out the experience of 
the seller, lack of experience of the buyer and the seller failed to point out the effect of 
quarantine on noxious weed located on the property. P. 803. 
Whereas there is no fiduciary obligation existing between a buyer and seller of real 
property ...an agent is licensed by the state and is required to meet the standard of 
"honesty, integrity, truthfulness, explanation and competency". 
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In this state the rule of caveat emptor does not apply to those dealing with a 
licensed real estate agent, Schafir v. Harrigan, Supra. 
In this case, Mr. Kim was a licensed real estate agent and solicited the Satsudas in 
purchasing the Capitol Motel (Tr. 241) although no listing agreement was signed with Ohs. 
(Tr. 242). He was paid $6,200.00 as a commission or finder's fee by Mr. Oh. (Tr. 222) 
Mr. Kim and Mr. Oh stated that the income figures for a forty (40) unit motel 
operation was presented to Satsudas in the pre-negotiations of the sale (Exh. 36, Tr. 224, 
Tr. 243). 40 units rentable (Tr. 245). 
Mr. Kim prepared the Earnest Money Agreement. (Exh. 14, Tr. 245). 
Whereas the Schafir case dealt with a proceeding brought directly against the real 
estate agent and others, the appellants believe the representations of Mr. Kim and the active 
and verbal representations by Mr. Oh that a forty (40) rentable unit was being purchased by 
the Satsudas and was reasonably replied by Satsudas. 
The appellant is well aware of the Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., Supra 
decided in March 1994. 
The Maack case involved an Earnest Money Agreement and "as is" clause. There is 
not "as is" clause in the instant case. 
Maack case had a one year builder warranty covering defects, materials and 
workmanship. The plaintiff, a licensed attorney, did not review the warrant nor have the 
house inspected. 
Material to the case at hand, the Maack Court discusses fraudulent non-disclosure 
stating: 
". . .the theory requires that the non-disclosed information must be material, known 
to the party failing to disclose and there must be a legal duty to disclose" citing First 
Security Bank v. Banbury Development, 786 P2d 12326 (Utah 1990). 
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'The question of whether a duty exists is answered by "reference to all of the 
circumstances to the case and by comparing facts not disclosed with the object and end in 
view by the contracting parties." 
"The proponent of such legal duty has the burden and persuasion and its existence 
prevents a question of law". Page 78. 
Citing the Restatement of Torts, sec. 551 (2) (b) at 119 (1977), the Maack Court 
states that "a party to transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to 
the other before the transaction is consummated . . . matters known to him that he knows to 
be necessary to prevent his partial or unambiguous statement of the facts from being 
misleading." Page 78. 
In the instant case, Ohs have a duty to disclose, at the least, the fact that five to six 
rooms were made without a building permit. Mr. Um testified that he advised Oh on two 
different occasions. Mr. Oh had a duty to disclose that the forty (40) rental units were not 
listed as such in the Salt Lake business license, a fact he was keenly made aware of by Mr. 
Um and by himself applying for a business license for Capitol Motel during the period of 
his ownership, 1987 to 1990. (Exh. 3, Tr. 202). 
Moreover, Oh was aware that improvements on the motel would require a building 
permit He put on aluminum siding in the office portion of the motel (middle building) by 
Top Shelf Construction and obtained a building permit in 1989. (Tr. 207, Exh. 32). 
The failure of Ohs to disclose the total rental units, i.e.; forty (40) units to Salt Lake 
City is a breach of his duty imposed by Salt Lake City. It should not be any less of a duty 
when he deals with a proposed purchaser. 
Had Oh disclosed the discrepancies between the 34 rooms licensed by Salt Lake 
City and the actual rentable units (40 rooms), this would have at least put Satsudas on 
notice that something was amiss and the Satsudas failure to further investigate may well 
have fallen below the exercise of reasonable care imposed by the Maack case. 
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The fact that the City License, posted in the office, does not and should not trigger 
the Satsudas duty to exercise reasonable care. Mr. Oh was the only one who was aware of 
this discrepancy and had a duty to call that fact to the Satsudas. 
Moreover, the Ohs aware of the five to six rooms were built without permit. 
Apparently, the trial court did not recognize this fact; therefore in its finding is clearly 
against the weight of the evidence. 
Satsudas on January 2, 1990 went to the Salt Lake City Licensing Department and 
filed their application for a business license, got a receipt, and were unaware of any 
problem at the time of closing (Tr. 28), held on January 5, 1990. Mr. Oh still remains 
silent. 
Similarly, Mr. Oh was aware of when he sold the motel that he did not have forty 
(40) parking stalls for forty rental units. Although he claims not to have known about the 
one parking stall for one rental unit, he had the duty to abide by the parking ordinance in 
place at the time and the law should impute this knowledge to him and other property 
owners who holds himself out to the public or potential purchasers that the sellers property 
conforms with, at a minimum, building and zoning requirements. 
Ms. Satsuda stated that she discussed parking with Mr. Oh and Mr. Oh stated "no 
problem" (Tr. 176). She was especially interested in parking because of the parking 
problems she experienced at the Korean Restaurant which the Satsudas owned prior to the 
purchase of the Capitol Motel. (Tr. 175) 
A parking variance was obtained in November of 1990 and the Satsudas expended 
$2,500.00 in attorney's fees in connection therewith. (Stip. Facts, Para. 49 -52). 
A reasonable inspection of the rooms would not have yielded the fact that the 
kitchenette in rooms 1-7 were put in without permit or that rooms 35-39 were constructed 
without a building permit. 
The defects in the electrical and plumbing were latent defects. (Tr. 32-33). Rooms 
1-6, the kitchenette rooms, the defects were not observable to the naked eye (as stated by 
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Mark H. Bowman, General Contractor would inspect the rooms and did the repairs. (Tr. 
142); although he did not have to 'knock down any walls or saw through any walls. (Tr. 
151, L 10-19). 
Nor would the visual inspection of room 35 put Satsudas on notice that room 35 
did not comply with the building code because of the lack of outside ventilation. 
Room 35 was permanently closed. (Larry Suggars, Tr. 131). 
Maack case states, (citation omitted), "fraudulent concealment course of action, 
inter alia, that u. .a careful, reasonable inspection on the part of the purchaser would not 
disclose the defect". 
Nor, as stated in Maack case, 'That a duty to disclose in a vendor-vendee 
transaction exists only where a defect is not discoverable by reasonable care", (citation 
omitted) 
As to whether there was an exercise of reasonable diligence on the part of Satsudas 
in the purchasing of the motel, it should be emphasized that in inspection of the rooms 
would not have yielded the defects, or would inspection of the Salt Lake City records 
would not have yielded the defects, i.e.; kitchenettes built without permit; rooms added 
without building permits or zoning violations. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants respectfully submits that the trial court's error in not finding fraud on 
the part of the Ohs in concealing a material factor to Satsudas, namely that some of the 
hotel rooms did not conform to code when it was represented to the Satsudas that it was a 
forty (40) unit rentable motel. 
Further, the express warranties survive the merger doctrine and the warranties were 
breached by the Ohs since Rooms 1 to 7, and 36 to 39 had electrical and plumbing defects, 
thus rendering those systems not in a satisfactory working condition. 
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As a result of the non-disclosure by the Ohs and/or the breach of Express 
Warranties by the Ohs, Satsudas suffered out-of-pocket expenses including reasonable 
attorney's fees at trial and on appeal. 
Moreover, Ohs cannot rely upon the other documents, Deed of Trust and Trust 
Promissory Note to serve as a basis for their attorney's fees since there was no breach. 
Similarly, the Real Estate Contract between and Ohs and Ums cannot serve as a 
contractual basis for attorney's fees since there was no default or breach of any of the 
covenants of the Real Estate Contract. 
The Assignment of Contract does not serve as a basis for Ohs' attorney's fees for 
the same reason, i.e., no breach of Satsudas' responsibilities under the Assignment of 
Contract. 
Finally, the attorney's fees for Ums against the Satsudas cannot be sustained 
because the Ums' attorney's fees are incurred as defending Ohs' claim, not Satsudas. No 
facts are stated to support the conclusion that Ums' attorney's fees were "cost, claim or 
damages" suffered by the Ohs. 
Appellants respectfully urge the Court to reverse the Judgment by the trial court and 
enter relief as stated by the appellants. 
DATED this 13 day of March, 1996. 
RESPE 
J^Uimj^AGK ATTORN A 
di 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
Delivered two copies of Brief of Appellants this 14 day of March, 1996 to the 
attorneys for the Defendant/Appellees and Attorney for \the Third Party 
Defendants/Appellees at: 
MR. JEFFERY WESTON SHIELDS 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
8900 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2340 
MR. STEPHEN R. SMITH, JR. 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants/Appellees 
Mooney Law Firm 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2006 
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
PLEADINGS 
Complaint. 
Third Party Complaint dated April 19,1993. 
Stipulation of Facts as to Undisputed Facts, filed February 13,1995. 
Stipulated Trial Exhibits, filed February 13, 1995. 
Transcript of Judge's Ruling, February 17, 1995. 
Minute entry dated April 19, 1995. 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law entered May 2, 1995. 
Order of Dismissal of Complaint and Third Party Complaint and Judgment 
in Favor of Defendants Ohs Against Plaintiffs Satsudas for Attorney's Fees, 
filed May 2. 
Proposed Order of Dismissal and Judgment, and Request for Clarification 
of Minute Entry. 
Third Party Defendants Motion to Open, Alter or Amend Judgment. 
First Amended Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law, filed June 9, 
1995. 
First Amended Order of Dismissal of Complaint and Third Party Complaint 
and Judgment in Favor of Defendants Ohs Against Plaintiffs Satsudas for 
Attorney's Fees, dated June 9, 1995. 
Minute Entry dated June 12, 1995. 
Notice of Appeal filed June 5, 1995. 
Minute Entry dated July 7,1995. 
Amended Notice of Appeal filed July 10,1995. 
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Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding 
Assessment of Third Party Defendants' Attorney's' Fees Against Plaintiffs 
dated July 7, 1995. 
Supplement Judgment of Third Party Defendants' Attorneys' Fees Awarded 
Plaintiffs 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal entered July 27, 1995. 
TRIAL EXHIBITS 
Earnest Money Agreement between Ohs and Urns 
Notice and Order dated February 12,1990 
Notice of Deficiencies 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement between Satsudas and Ohs 
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JIMI MITSUNAGA #2279 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
731 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 322-3551 
Telecopier: (801) 322-3554 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and 
SEON SIL SATSUDA, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HASIN OH and MYUNG JA 
OH, his wife, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
C i v i l No 
Judqe: 
q/Ctfcns'i ?*' 
TO j. mm n 
The plaintiffs^ for a cause of action alleges: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. That the plaintiffs and defendants are residents 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That the contract hereinafter alleged was entered 
into in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. The real property, which is the subject matter of 
the contract is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. That said contract is to be performed in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS 
5. That the parties entered in an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement listing the defendants as sellers and the plaintiffs 
as buyers on November 16, 1989. 
6. That said Earnest Money Sales Agreement states, in 
substance, that defendants (sellers) would sell to the 
plaintiffs (buyers) a motel known as the Capitol Motel, 
located at 1749 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake County, State of Otah. 
7. A copy of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement is 
attached as Exhibit A to this complaint. 
8. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement provided, among 
other terms, a purchase price of Six Hundred Twenty Thousand 
Dollars ($620,000.00) for the Capitol Motel. 
9. Pursuant to said agreement the plaintiffs paid the 
defendants the sum of One Hundred Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty 
Four Dollars and sixty eight cents ($100,734.68) which includes 
a Five Thousand Dollar ($5,000.00) deposit on November 21, 1989. 
10. Moreover, the plaintiff assumed the prior indebted-
ess to the defendant's predecessor, Kee Hong Urn and Shi Ja 
Urn, his wife, and agreed to pay the defendants the balance of 
One Hundred and Two Thousand Dollars ($102,000.00) over a 
period of ten (10) years. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
11. The plaintiffs incorporates paragraph 1 through 9 
in the First Cause of Action. 
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12. Paragraph C of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
reads: 
C. Seller Warranties: Seller warrants that (a) 
Seller has received no claims nor notice of any 
building or zoning violation concerning the property 
which has not nor will not be remedied prior to 
closing; (b) all obligations against the property 
including taxesf assessments, mortgages, liens or 
other encumbrances of any nature shall be brought 
current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, 
heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, 
electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in 
satisfactory working condition at closing, 
13. That the defendants breached the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement dated on or about November 16, 1989. 
14. The Capitol Motel, subject matter of the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement, was represented by the defendants 
as a forty (40) unit motel when, in fact, the Capitol Motel 
lacked adequate parking spaces for a forty (40) unit motel, 
according to the Uniform Housing Code (UHC), Salt Lake City 
Corporation. 
15. Further, several units were in violation of the 
aforesaid code. A copy of the code violations, issued by 
Lawrence Suggars, Salt Lake City Department of Building and 
Housing Services is attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
16. Further, seven (7) units of the motel was built 
without an authorized building permit from the Salt Lake City 
Corporation. 
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17. The defendants had knowledge of the aforesaid 
deficiencies and failed to disclose the same to the plain-
tiffs. 
18. The failure of the defendants to disclose the defi-
ciencies is in violation of the seller's warranty as stated in 
paragraph 12 above. 
19. As a result of defendant's breach of warranty, 
the plaintiff suffered general and special damages as set 
forth in paragraph 22 and 23 below. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
20. The plaintiff incoporates paragraphs 1 through 
19 in the Second Cause of Action. 
21. That the defendants had a duty to disclose the 
deficiencies noted in paragraph 15 and the failure to dis-
close a^bxeach of the cxpres^^and/or implied covenant to 
,deal in good faith to the plaintiffs. 
22. _A5__a-tesult of defendants intentional misrepre-
sentation, the plaintiffs suffered general damages which 
is the difference between the value of the property as re-
presented and its actual value as purchased. The general 
damages is one hundred thousand eight thousand five hundred 
thirty eight dollars and fifty cents ($108,538.50). The 
plaintiffs reserves the right to amend the amount of 
general damages. 
23. As a result of defendants intentional misrepre-
sentations, the plaintiffs suffered special damages which 
arises from the special circumstances and directly trace-
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able to the failure of the defendants to discharge con-
tractual obligations. The special damages suffered by the 
plaintiff are the costs of correcting the deficiencies, ob-
taining a variance for the additional seven (7) units, 
attorney's fees and construction costs. The special da-
mages up to date of the complaint is thirteen thousand six 
hundred twenty one dollars ($13,621.00) for construction 
costs, attorney's fees of approximately five thousand dol-
lars ($5,000.00), future construction of twenty three thou-
sand six hundred sixty dollars ($23,660.00) and loss of 
revenue, an amount to be determined. The plaintiff reserves 
the right to amend its special damages. 
THIRD CAUSE OP ACTION 
24. The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 23 
in the third cause of action. 
25. The plaintiffs were inexperienced in matters and 
estate transactions dealing with motel purchases. 
26. That to the best knowledge and information of the 
plaintiffs, the defendants have had experience in the buy-
ing and selling of real estate and motels in particular. 
27. That the defendants represented to the plaintiffs 
that the gross incomes of Capitol Motel was Two Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) gross per year. 
28. The defendants represented that the Capitol Motel 
was a forty (40) unit motel. 
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29. That defendant represented the Capitol Motel 
as a forty (40) unit by the Salt Lake City Business Regis-
tration. 
30. That the plaintiffs relied upon the oral represen-
tation of the defendants and was induced in the purchase of 
the Capitol Motel by the defendants requested purchase price 
of Six Hundred and Twenty Thousand Dollars ($620,000.00). 
31. That the defendants representation was material 
to the plaintiffs1 decision to enter into the purchase 
agreement. 
32. That the defendants representations were false 
and the defendants knew the representation were false, both 
as to existing facts and future facts. 
33. That the fact that seven (7) of the units were 
built without a building permit from Salt Lake City 
Corporation was a material fact which the defendants had a 
duty to disclose because of the relation of trust and in 
quality of condition and knowledge of the parties. 
34. That as a result of the defendants1 conduct, the 
plaintiffs suffered loss of the bargain and incurred 
additional expenses in bringing the motel to meet Salt Lake 
Building Code requirements. The loss of the bargain was 
the loss suffered by the plaintiff as being the difference 
between the purchase price of the subject property and 
actual value of the subject property. 
35. The additional expenses incurred by the plaintiffs 
to bring the motel to the Building Code requirement as listed 
in paragraph 23 above. 
FOURTH CADSE OF ACTION - PDNITIVE DAMAGES 
36. The plaintiffs incorporates paragraphs 1 to 
35 in the fourth cause of action. 
37. The aforesaid representations and conduct was 
wilful, intentional and malicious on the part of the de-
fendants. 
38. That the plaintiff is entitled to punitive da-
mages in the sum not to exceed fifty thousand dollars 
($50,000.00), attorney's fees and costs of court. 
39. That the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, attached 
as Exhibit A, provides, in substance, that the defaulting 
party shall pay all costs and expenses, including reason-
able attorney's fees. 
40. That the plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable 
attorney's fees from the defendants, plus all costs and 
expenses. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs pray for judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows: 
(1) First Cause of Action: General damages in the 
sum of $108,538.00, special damages in the sum of 
$42,281.00, plus loss of revenues provable at the 
time of trial, reasonable attorney's fees, costs 
and expenses of court. 
(2) Second Cause of Action: General damages in 
the sum of $108,538.00, special damages in the 
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sum of $42,281.00, plus loss of revenues provable at 
the time of trial, reasonable attorney's fees, costs 
and expenses of court. 
(3) Third Cause of Action: General damages in the 
sum of $108,538.00, special damages in the sum of 
$42,281.00, plus loss of revenues provable at the 
time of trial, reasonable attorney's fees, costs 
and expenses of court. 
(4) Fourth Cause of Action: Punitive damages not to 
exceed $50,000.00, attorney's fees and costs and ex-
penses. 
(5) Reasonable attorneyfs fees, costs and expenses 
provable at the time of trial and, 
(6) Such other and further relief as the Court 
deems meets the premises. 
DATED this 15th day of March, 1990v 
cXfllXl MITSUNAGA 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
T^  
P l a i n t i f f s ' address: 
Capitol Motel 
1749 South State Street 
Sal t Lake City, UT 
Disk S10-89;Satsuda Comp:bm 
Tab 2 
Grant W. P. Morrison 3666 
Attorney for Defendants 
1200 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 485-7999 
By. 
Third Judical D.atrci 
APR 1 9 1393 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and 
SEON SIL SATSUDA, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 













THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
Judge Frederick 
Case No. 910901751 
COMES NOW Grant W. P. Morrison, attorney for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh, who hereby 
complain and allege as follows: 
1. Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh are residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah and were so at all times mentioned herein. 
2. A contract purporting to sell property located at 1749 
South State, Salt Lake City, Utah was executed in Salt Lake County, 
n n ? i i 
State of Utah, 
3. The property in dispute at 1749 South State, Salt Lake 
City, Utah is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
4. On or about February 28, 1987, Third Party Plaintiffs 
purchased a motel from Kee Hong Urn and Shi Ja Um (Earnest Money 
Agreement attached as Exhibit A, Uniform Real Estate Contract 
attached as Exhibit B). 
5. Pursuant to Exhibit A, the property was described as a 
"40 unit motel". 
6. This property was subsequently sold to Wayne Takashi 
Satsuda and Seon Satsuda on or about November 21, 1989. The 
Satsudas are suing the Oh's for breach of contract, violation of 
warranty, and so forth within the above-entitled action. 
7. Paragraph 6 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement (Exhibit 
A states in pertinent part, "Seller warrants that (a) Seller has 
received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation 
concerning the property which has or will not be remedied prior to 
closing." 
8. The Third Party Defendants breached the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement dated February 28, 1987. 
9. At the time the Earnest Money Sales Agreement was signed, 
February 28, 1987, the Sellers represented the property to be in 
conformity with all code requirements and to be a 40 room motel, 
yet there were serious Uniform Housing Code, City Code and Zoning 
Code violations (Exhibit C). 
10. That of the 40 rooms alleged, seven (7) of these units 
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were built without an authorized building permit. 
11. That had these code violations been brought to the 
attention of Third Party Plaintiffs that they would never had 
agreed to purchase the motel or would not have purchased the motel 
until these violations had been satisfied. 
12. As a result of Third Party Defendant's breach of warranty 
the Plaintiff suffered general damages and special damages in an 
amount to be determined at trial and attorney's fees, costs and 
expenses of court. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
13. The Third Party Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 
through 12 as fully set forth herein. 
14. The Third Party Defendant's had a duty to disclose the 
deficiencies heretofore described and the failure to disclose these 
deficiencies is a breach of the express and/or implied covenant to 
deal in good faith. 
15. As a result of Third Party Defendant's intentional 
misrepresentation, the Third Party Plaintiffs suffered general 
damages which is the difference between the value of the property 
as represented and its actual value as purchased. 
16. That Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to recover general 
and special damages as a result of Third Party Defendants actions 
in an amount to be determined at trial and attorney's fees, costs 
and expenses of court. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
17. Third Party Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 
16 as fully set forth herein. 
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18. That Third Party Defendants intentionally misrepresented 
that the property was free of zoning and code violations and 
committed fraud in the inducement by selling a property that Third 
Party Plaintiffs knew was in violation of City and other 
ordinances. 
19. That as a result of Third Party Defendant's fraud, Third 
Party Plaintiffs have suffered general and special damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial and attorney's fees, costs and 
expenses of court. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
20. Third Party Plaintiff's reincorporate paragraphs 1 
through 19 as fully set forth herein. 
21. That Third Party Defendants represented the motel to be 
a 40 unit motel. 
22. That the additional 7 units were built without a building 
permit. 
23. That Third Party Plaintiff's subsequently sold the motel 
to the Satsudas, who within this lawsuit is seeking damages against 
Third Party Plaintiff's for having to bring the motel into 
compliance with city and other codes. 
24. That Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to indemnification 
and contribution for any judgment against the Ohs by Satsudas with 
respect to the subject property, with Plaintiffs alleging special 
damages up to date of the complaint at thirteen thousand six 
hundred twenty one dollars, for construction costs, attorney's fees 
of five thousand dollars, future construction costs of twenty-three 
thousand dollars, and so forth. The Third Party Plaintiffs reserve 
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the right to amend its special damages. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
25. Paragraphs 1 through 24 are incorporated as fully set 
forth herein-
26. Third Party Defendants actions and conduct were willful, 
wanton, intentional and malicious so as to warrant punitive 
damages. 
27. That Third Party Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive 
damages in the amount of $100,000 and for attorneys fees and costs 
of this action. 
28. That the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, attached as 
Exhibit A, provides that the defaulting party shall pay all costs 
and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
29. That the Third Party Plaintiffs are entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees from the Third Party Defendants plus all 
costs and expenses. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
30. Paragraphs 1 through 29 are incorporated as fully set 
forth herein. 
31. That Third Party Defendants are unjustly enriched because 
of the inflated value of the purchase price and the fact that 
subsequent improvements have been necessary to bring the motel in 
conformity with code, and Third Party Plaintiffs are entitled to 
the cost of the improvements and the difference between the 
purchase price and the true fair market value of the property at 
the time of sale. 
WHEREFORE, the Third Party Plaintiffs pray for judgment in 
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favor of the Third Party Plaintiff and against the Third Party 
Defendants as follows: 
1. First Cause of Action: General Damages in an amount to 
be proven at trial and reasonable attorney's fees, costs and 
expenses of court. 
2. Second Cause of Action: General and special damages, 
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses of court in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
3. Third Cause of Action: General and special damages in 
an amount to be proven at trial, and reasonable attorney's fees, 
costs and expenses of court. 
4. Fourth Cause of Action: Indemnification and contribution 
damages in an amount to be proven at trial and reasonable 
attorney's fees, costs and expenses of court. 
5. Fifth Cause of Action: Punitive damages in the amount 
of $100,000, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses of 
court. 
6. Sixth Cause of Action: General and special damages, 
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses of court. 
7. Such other and further relief as the Court deems meets 
the premises. 
DATED this 8th day of April, 1993. 
Grant W. P. Morrison 
Attorney for Third Party 
Plaintiffs and Defendants 
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Jeffrey Weston Shields, (2948) 
PURSER & EDWARDS, L.L.C. 
39 Market Street, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2104 
Telephone: (801) 532-3555 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and 
SEON SIL SATSUDA, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, : STATEMENT OF 
: STIPULATED FACTS 
V, 
HASIN OH and MYUNG JA OH, : 
his wife, : 
Defendants, : 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * z 
HASIN OH AND MYUNG JA OH, : Civil No. 910901751 
his wife, : 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
V, : 
KEE HONG UM and SHI JA UM, 
his wife, : 
Third-Party Defendants. : 
Plaintiffs Wayne Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda, 
Defendants Has in Oh and Myung Ja Oh, and Third-Party Defendants Kee 
Hong Um and Shi Ja Um, by and through their attorneys of record, 
stipulate to the following facts for all purposes and proceedings 
at trial in this matter. 
r-FEB 13 P;H:29 
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1. Kee Kong Urn ("Urn") was experienced in the real estate 
business and involved in the buying and selling of real estate 
prior to May 1982. 
2. The Capitol Motel had 35 rooms before construction of 
the five additional units in 1983. 
3. Urn hired a contractor that would build the five 
additional units. The contractor he hired did not obtain a 
building permit. 
4. When Urn sold the Capitol Motel to Hasin Oh ("Oh") in 
1987, 39 rooms were available for rental. 
5. Urn never notified Salt Lake City officials that the 
five additional units were constructed on the Capitol Motel 
premises. 
6. The Capitol Motel, located at 1749 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah was bought by the Ums as virtually 
condemned on September 1, 1982 and was shut down entirely by the 
City that fall. 
7. Urn completed repairs on the Capitol Motel in the 
spring of 1983, bringing the motel back up to its original 34 
licensed units. 
8. Urn did not obtain a building permit before making the 




9. During the Urns7 ownership of Capitol Motel, the Salt 
Lake City-County Health Department and Salt Lake City Fire 
Department inspected the Capitol Motel premises. Each department 
found that the motel met its inspection standards, after repairs 
were completed in 1982-83. 
10. The building was inspected under construction permit 
3 3 603 and approved on March 21, 1985. 
11. One room on the second floor of the Capitol Motel's 
main building was converted from storage room to a rental room by 
Urn's Seller, Juan Garcia. 
12. In the Spring of 1983, a swimming pool upon the 
premises was covered over so that a small grocery store could be 
constructed. 
13. The grocery store was converted into five additional 
rental units in January 1984, giving the Capitol Motel a total of 
40 units available for rent when the Ohs purchased the property in 
1987. 
14. Urn knew that no building permit had been obtained 
for the conversion of the grocery store into the five rooms and Urn 
did not instruct his contractor to obtain a permit, and no building 




15. After passing inspection on March 21, 1985, the Urns 
never received any written notice that the additional five units 
did not meet any code requirements• 
16. The new Capitol Motel continued to pass every 
health, building and fire inspection after the additional five 
rooms were constructed until Lawrence Suggars inspected the 
premises in January 1990. 
17. Thereafter the Urns operated the Capitol Motel with 
a total of up to 40 rooms available for rental to the public. 
18. The Urns did not alter their business license 
application after adding the five new units, continuing to renew 
their license each year to show only a 34 unit motel on the face of 
the license. 
19. The licensing fees for a 40-room motel would be 
higher than for a 34-room motel. The Urns were aware of the higher 
fees. 
20. On February 28, 1987 the Urns executed an Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement with the Ohs for the sale of "a 40 unit motel 
called Capitol Motel" located at 1749 South State Street, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah for the sum of $550,000.00. 
21. Between the execution of the Earnest Money and the 




from the motel and provided a hand-written income and expense 
statement to the Ohs. Urn also stated that he had remodeled or 
reconstructed and fixed up most of the rooms and had made repairs 
to the motel. 
22. On March 20, 1987, the Salt Lake City/County Health 
Department inspected the Capitol Motel and found only minor 
infractions such as dust under a bed, filth in a bathroom and no 
lids on the dumpsters. 
23. The Ums represented to the Ohs that the Capitol 
Motel had up to 40 units available for rent. 
24. The Ohs went to the Capitol Motel about ten times 
during the month before the Earnest Money Sales Agreement between 
the Ums as sellers and the Ohs as buyers was signed and inspected 
only a couple of rooms on the ground floor of the main building. 
25. The Ohs did not obtain a professional inspection of 
the property prior to closing. 
26. At no time before the commencement of this action 
did the Ohs expressly request that the Ums provide information 
regarding parking, building inspections, construction of additional 
rooms, putting additional rooms into service, or inspection of more 





27. On May 1, 1987, Urns and Ohs executed a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for the principal sum of $540,000.00 (EXHIBIT 1 
herein). 
28. The Ohs consistently rented more than 34 units at 
the Capitol Motel and advertised to the public that the Capitol 
Motel was a 40-unit motel. 
29. On February 21, 1989, building permit number 38372 
was issued for the installation of aluminum siding and fascia on 
the front of the central building of the New Capitol Motel by the 
Top Shelf Construction Company. Final inspection of the siding was 
conducted and approved by Salt Lake City on September 14, 1989. 
30. Salt Lake City Fire Department fire safety surveys 
were conducted on the Capitol Motel in 1982, 1984, 1986, November 
1989, January 1990, February 1990 and June 1993. The Fire 
Department's "Premises History" report shows that the property had 
some minor violations discovered in 1986 which were promptly 
corrected, and that the motel passed the fire safety surveys of 
November 7, 1989 and January 4, 1990 just before the Ohs sold the 
property to the Satsudas. 
31. On November 16, 1989 the Ohs executed an Earnest 




"Capitol Motel" located at 1749 South State Street, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah for the sum of $620,000.00. 
32. During the negotiations for the Capitol Motel, the 
Ohs represented orally and on Mr. Oh's business card that the 
Capitol Motel was a 40-unit motel. 
33. During the negotiations for the sale of the 
property, Hasin Oh gave Satsuda daily income figures for the motel 
for the period 1987 through September 1989 that he maintained in 
his five steno books. The steno notebooks showed how many of the 
40 rooms were rented at any one time. 
34. The Satsudas made an offer to purchase the Capitol 
Motel to a Mr. Kim, the Ohs7 agent, after two meetings with the Ohs 
at the Capitol Motel. 
35. During pre-closing discussions, Mr. Oh indicated 
that he had put aluminum framed windows in place of the original 
wood framed windows. 
36. The Satsudas inspected four or five rental rooms, 
the laundry room, and boiler rooms. 
37. The Satsudas did not obtain a third-party inspection 
of the property prior to closing. 





39. The Capitol Motel's business license was hanging on 
the wall in the motel office and was first examined by the Satsudas 
on January 1, 1990. 
40. On January 5, 1990, the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
between Urns and Ohs was assigned to Satsudas. 
41. After the Suggars' inspection in January 1990, the 
Satsudas were advised by the Salt Lake Building Inspection office 
that there were no records of the five additional rooms. 
42. The Satsudas received a "Notice of Deficiencies" 
from Lawrence Suggars, Enforcement Officer, Salt Lake City 
Department of Building and Housing Services, dated January 31, 
1990, postmarked February 12, 1990. 
43. After the Satsudas changed the license and utilities 
into their own name, Salt Lake City building inspector, Larry 
Suggars, a fire inspector, and a health department inspector came 
out to examine the property. 
44. Larry Suggars called in electrical and plumbing 
inspectors for further inspection. 
45. By letter dated February 22, 1990, Robert M. Bridge, 
the Salt Lake City Business Supervisor, advised the Satsudas that 




the incorrect number of units listed. The Satsudas corrected the 
number of units on his business license application. 
46. The Satsudas contacted the Urns about the Notice of 
Deficiencies and Um declared to Mrs. Satsuda that he (Um) had fully 
disclosed to the Ohs that the five additional rooms had been built 
without a building permit. 
47. Room 0 through 7, which had kitchenettes, were 
inspected in January 1990 and found to be plumbed incorrectly and 
to have electrical wiring that was not up to code. 
48. Parking for the Capitol Motel was zoned for only 33 
rooms. 
49. A parking variance that allowed the Capitol Motel to 
rent up to 40 units was obtained in November 1990. 
50. The remaining five rooms were remodeled after the 
parking variance was approved by Salt Lake City in November 1990. 
51. Construction on rooms 0, 7 and 35 through 39 started 
in February 1991 and was completed in March 1991. 
52. The Satsudas spent approximately $2,500.00 in 
attorney's fees to obtain a variance on the parking requirements 
for the 40 unit motel. 
0701673.jws 
93-189.2 9 
53. The Satsudas sold the Capitol Motel on January 5, 
1994 for $860,000.00, a sura that is $240,000.00 more than the 
purchase price from the Ohs. 
DATED this /3 day of February, 1995. 
c^liilutsunaga 
Attorney for Plairitif jl irftii 
Steppeir R. Smith 





CERTIFICATE OF 8ERVICB 
I hereby certify that on the 1 dr day of February, 1995, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing STATEMENT OP 
STIPULATED PACTS, by depositing copies thereof in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Stephen R. Smith, Esq. 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq. 
731 E. South Temple 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR S 
STATE OF UTAH 
' LAKE '""COUNTY 
I OiSfflFtfito**' 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and 
SEON SIL SATSUDA, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




KEE HONG UM and SHI JA UM, 




Civil No. 910901751 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The parties hereby stipulate to the admission of the following 
exhibits for trial: 
E«h # Daia Description 
1 5-1-87 UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT between Kee Hong 
Urn and Shi Ja Um as Seller and Has in Oh and 
Myung Ja Oh as Buyer; $540,000.00. 
2 82-88 HOUSING, OFFICIAL INSPECTION REPORT, Salt Lake 
City-County Health Department; 1986-87, 40 
units. 
3 5-5-87 HASIN OH BUSINESS LICENSE APPLICATION for the 
Capitol Motel, with 34 rooms, granted June 26, 
1987. 
1-11-88 BUSINESS LICENSE RECEIPT, New Capitol Motel 
(renewal application). 
9-14-89 BUILDING PERMIT SCREEN PRINTOUTS, permit 
#38372, for aluminum siding. 
1982-93 Capitol Motel PREMISE HISTORY: license 
application, inspections record for fire 
inspections* 
1-2-90 WAYNE SATSUDA BUSINESS LICENSE APPLICATION for 
the Capitol Motel, with 34 rooms, granted 
October 2, 1990. 
1-5-90 Documents conveying interest in the Capitol 
Motel from Hasin Oh and Myung Oh as Sellers to 
Wayne Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda as 
Buyer: Warranty Deed; Assignment of Contract 
between Mr. Oh and Mr. Urn to Mr. Satsuda for 
$417,902.79; Bill of Sale (with warranties) for 
all equipment and supplies; Assignment of 
Contract (for security) re: promissory note for 
$102,100; Request for Notice, for copy of any 
notice default or sale to be sent to Satsuda; 
Deed of Trust with assignment of rents for 
$102,100; Trust Deed Note for $102,000 with 
addendum; Buyers Settlement Statement with 
Amortization Schedule; Assignment & Assumption 
of Lease between RCA and the Capitol Motel; UCC 
Financing Statement re: all equipment and 
supplies; Policy of Title Insurance issued by 
Associated Title. 
2-22-90 NOTICE OF ZONING VIOLATION; Letter from Robert 
M. Bridge, Business License Supervisor to 
Capitol Motel re: Business License Application 
Status; Lawrence Suggars inspector. 
10-2-90 STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT in the matter of: 
Lawrence Suggars and Wayne Satsuda re: business 
license approval. 
1983-1990 Salt Lake City TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES, showing 
Capitol Motel advertisement, 34 rooms in 1983, 
40 rooms 84-90. 
12 1993 Oriental Real Estate Directory - Mr. Kim, top 
producer. 
13 undated Handwritten notes re: *Permanent* loss of room 
#35; per unit loss of income during remodeling. 
14 11-14-89 EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT, accepted by the 
Oh's 11-16-89, subject to purchase of Imperial 
400 Motel. 
15 1-31-90 NOTICE OF DEFICIENCIES of Building, Electrical 
and Plumbing codes; permits to be obtained. 
Lawrence Suggars, enforcement officer. 
16 7-5-90 BID PROPOSAL AND SPECIFICATIONS, Commercial 
Remodeling Company (estimate), $13,621, with 
standard form of agreement between owner and 
contractor. 
17 12-6-90 Letter from Commercial Remodeling Company to 
Wayne @ Capitol Motel re: bid proposal for 
repairs need to comply with cods, describing 
SCOPE OF WORK. 12-13-90 note- Larry Sugars, 
must start by 2-1-91. 
18 9-7-90 VARIANCE REQUEST to Board of Adjustment, 
received by Development Service 9-7-90 & 10-2-
90 (only an estimate of repairs needed, doesn't 
show work done). 
19 11-5-90 FINDINGS AND ORDER, Case no. 1418-B, before the 
Board of Adjustment, Report of the Commission 
re: Variance appeal. 
20 11-7-91 ABSTRACT OF FINDINGS AND ORDER re: 11-5-90 
decision of the board of adjustment, variance 
to become null and void if permit if not taken 
out in six months from 11-27-90, acknowledged 
11-7-91, recorded 12-12-91. 
21 1/90- CAPITOL MOTEL EXPENSE SHEETS. Handwritten 
4/93 lists of monthly expenditures. 
22 4/90 STATEMENT prepared for Kee Hong Urn signature 
re: disclosure to OH of units built without: 
permit, unsigned. 
23 1983-86 Handwritten INCOME AND EXPENSE sheets marked 
Confidential-Agent use only, do not distribute. 
24 1987 ADDENDUM TO UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT form, 
between Mr. and Mrs. Urn as Sellers and Mr. and 
Mrs. Oh as Buyers. 
BUSINESS LICENSE RECEIPT, new owner of the New 
Capitol Motel, 34 rooms. 
BUILDING PERMIT INFORMATION: permit screen, 
developers screen, inspection screen printout. 
GENERAL MOTEL LAYOUT BLUEPRINT. 
MAIN OFFICE, ADDITIONAL 5 ROOMS DETAIL 
BLUEPRINT. 
NOTICE AND ORDER to the Capitol Motel, Wayne 
Satsuda from Salt Lake Building and Housing 
Services, pursuant to inspection of 1-31-90. 
FINAL DENIAL LETTER to Capitol Motel from Salt 
Lake Business Licensing, failure to correct 
deficiencies. 
Handwritten expense sheets for the Capitol 
Motel, totaling $63,870.10, signed by Kee Hong 
Urn. (Exhibit to Hasin Oh deposition). 
CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT between Hasin Oh-Capitol 
Motel and Top Shelf Construction, $10,300 for 
replacement of window, siding installation and 
rain gutters. (Exhibit 6 to Hasin Oh 
deposition). 
33 4/83 Handwritten Contract for Construction between 















34 Spring '83 Expense accounting for purchase expenses re: 
Kee Umf s purchase contract from Juan Garcia• 
35 2-28-87 EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT between Hason Oh and 
Kee Um for purchase of Capital Motel 
Dated this 13th day of February, 1995. 
Attorr>&y for Hasin Oh 
^ 
R. SMITH 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G 
12 
2 THE COURT: We are reconvened in the matter of 
3 Wayne and Seon Satsuda versus Kasin Oh, et cetera, case 
4
 J number C-91-1751. Counsel and the parties are present. 
The instant matter was tried to the bench on 
6 I February the 14th and the 15th, 1995. The case was then 
7 taken under advisement to enable this Court to further 
8 consider the testimony elicited and the exhibits received. 
9 Having now done so, this Court is prepared to rule. 
10 The plaintiffs seek fay their Complaint filed March 
n J 13, 1991, damages against the defendants for breach of 
warranties in the Earnest Money Agreement, Exhibit 14, in 
13 I that, one, though operated as a 40-unit motel, the Capitol 
14 Motel at 1714 South State Street in Salt Lake City, there 
15 were parking spaces for only 32 rooms, and two, several of 
16 the rooms had inadequate ventilation and substandard 
17 plumbing and electrical fixtures, and three, seven of the 
18 rooms were constructed without a Salt Lake City building 
19 permit. 
20 In addition, plaintiffs claim that defendants 
21 intentionally misrepresented or fraudulently concealed the 
22 I above-described pertinent facts in the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement anc that defendants failed to bargain with the 
olaintiffs in aood faith and in accord with the rules of 
23 
24 
25 I fair dealing. 
Plaintiffs sought loss of benefit of the bargain 
damages, as well as punitive damages initially. The 
stipulated facts arrived at between the parties herein are 
accepted to the extent that they are material and to the 
extent that they are not modified by this Court's percep-
tion of the evidence as follows. 
The credible and persuasive evidence establishes, 
in this Court's view, as follows. Third-party defendants 
acquired the subject property in 1982. They made several 
modifications to the property by hiring contractors. In 
1983 third-party defendants hired a contractor and 
converted certain space into six additional rental rooms. 
Exhibit 33, stipulated facts 2, 11, 12 and 13. Third-party 
defendants thought that all v/ork constructed and paid for 
would be done pursuant to both code and building permit 
regulations. Stipulated fact number 3. It was not until 
the work was completed that third-party defendants became 
aware that a building permit had not been obtained. It 
was not until January 1990, after the plaintiffs took 
possession, that third-party defendants became aware that 
there existed zoning and building code deficiencies. 
Third-party defendants sold the property to the 
defendants on May 1, 1987, for $540,000, stipulated 
facts 20 and 27, Exhibit 1, which consisted of 39 units. 
Stioulated fact 4. Third-partv defendants did not disclose 
-7 
i the additional units to Salt Lake City, choosing to renew 
2 their business license by mail. Exhibit 3, stipulated 
3 facts 5 and 18. 
4 The fees for licensing a 40-unit motel were more 
5 than they are for a 34-unit motel. Stipulated fact 19. 
6 While third-party defendants owned the property, 
7 numerous inspections were conducted by the Salt Lake City 
8 and County Health Department, as well as the Salt Lake 
9 City Fire Department. Said inspections were satisfactory, 
Stipulated facts 9, 10, 22 and 30. 
No notice of any deficiencies occurred until 
Lawrence Suggars, a trainee inspector, inspected in 
January 1990. Stipulated facts 15 and 16. The plaintiff 












which complied with all building codes and zoning 
recuirements. 
18 They met with the defendants mostly at the property 
approximately four times prior to closing and only inspect 
on the third occasion some four or five rooms, the boiler 
and laundry rooms. Stipulated facts 24 and 36. Wo third-
22 | party inspection was obtained, though the plaintiffs had 
23 | every right to obtain such pursuant to paragraph 3 of the 
24 Earnest .Money Sales Agreement. Stipulated fact 3 7 
25 I Defendants did not prohibit further inspections. Indeed, 
1 as of at least January 1, 1990, some four days before 
2 closing, plaintiffs were in possession, stipulated fact 38, 
3 had all the keys and unfettered access to the premises. 
4 J Stipulated fact 25. 
No information was requested by the plaintiffs 
6 I during these meetings with regard to parking, building 
7 inspections, construction history, et cetera. Stipulated 
8 fact 26. Moreover, the business license reflecting 34 
9 J units approved for rental hung at all pertinent times on 
the wall in the office, even after the possession date of 
January 1, 1990, of the plaintiffs. Yet, that document 
was not examined by the plaintiffs until January 1 of 1990, 
which still, however, was some four days prior,to closing. 
Stipulated fact 39. 
15 I Plaintiffs had executed an Earnest Money Sales 
16 Agreement to purchase the property as a represented 40-unit 
17 motel for some $620,000 on November 16, 1989. Stipulated 
18 I fact 31, Exhibit 14. 
After Suggars's inspection in January of 1990, 
plaintiffs were advised of the deficiencies on or about 
the 12th of February, 1990. Stipulated facts 41, 42, 43, 
22 | 44 and 45, and Exhibits 2, 9, 15 and 29. 
Plaintiffs obtained a parking variance at a cost of 
some $2,500 in attorney's fees. Stipulated facts 52 and 48 












1 except for unit 35, which was permanently closed. Stipulate^ 
2 facts 50 and 51. Plaintiffs completely closed certain units 
3 during remodeling which was not required by Salt Lake City. 
4 Plaintiffs thereafter sold the property on January 5, 1994, 
5 during the pendency of this case for some $850,000, 
6 240,000 more than their purchase price. Stipulated fact 53. 
7 This Court is persuaded by the evidence, the credible 
8 evidence, that neither the defendants nor the third-party 
9 defendants were aware of any building or zoning violations, 
10 or particularly the effect or meaning of such violations. 
n The defendants and third-party defendants speak broken 
12 English and their understanding of the effect of claimed 
13 violations, in this Court!s view, is lacking. 
14 Moreover, this Court is persuaded that the doctrine 
15 of merger as addressed in the defendant's and third-party 
16 defendant's trial briefs bars the claim of breach of 
17 warranties for the reasons specified in those briefs. 
18 That leaves then the question of fraudulent misre-
19 presentation. To establish a claim of fraudulent misrepre-
20 sentation or concealment in a land sale transaction the 
21 plaintiffs must establish by clear and convincing evidence 
22 that representations were made concerning presently 
23 existing material facts which were false and which the 
24 representor knev/ to be false and/or made recklessly, knowing 
25 I that he had insufficient information or knowledge upon which 
1 to base such representation for the purpose of inducing the 
2 other party to act upon it and the other party indeed does 
3 act reasonably in ignorance of the falsity and relies on 
4 the false representation, to his injury. 
5 Necessary to such a finding, as set forth in the 
6 cases of Ilaack versus Resource Design, 875 P.2d. 570, 
7 Court of Appeals 1994, and Schafir versus Karrigan, 245 
8 Utah Advanced Reports 15, Utah Appeals 1994, necessary to 
9 such a finding of fraudulent misrepresentation is clear 
10 and convincing evidence that the defendants and, in turn, 
n the third-party defendants intentionally or actively 
concealed claimed defects. This must be shown in the face 
of establishing that the plaintiffs, after careful and 
14 | reasonable inspection, would not have discovered said 
15 defects. This, plaintiffs have failed to establish. 
16 Plaintiffs have not established that they reasonably relied 
17 ) on the alleged false statements. The plaintiffs have failed 
18 to establish that they exercised reasonable diligence in 
19 verifying these alleged falisities. 
20 I For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no 
21 i cause of action on the plaintiff's Complaint and the 





Reasonable attorney's fees are awarded to the 
defendants and the third-party defendants, the amount of 
25 which is to be determined by submission of affidavits 
1 pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Adminis-
2 tration. 
3 I am somewhat concerned, given the identity --
4 essential identity of role in this case between the 
5 defendants and the third-party defendants, that there not 
6 be duplication in claimed fees to be paid here. While it 
7 is true that a better posture of the case may well have 
g been to name third-party defendants as defendants so that 
this issue was not as confused as it is, the fact is that 
is not the case, so I am confronted with the need to make 
a determination about fees to the defendants and then, in 
turn, fees to the third-party defendants, but I find no 
cause of action on either the Complaint or the third-party 
14 I Complaint. 
Mr. Shields, I want you to do the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, submit that to your 

















MR. MITSUNAGA: Your Honor, may I inquire as to the 
basis for awarding the defendants attorney1s fees in the 
matter? Is it pursuant to the contract or — 
THE COURT: It's pursuant to the contract, at least 
at this stage. I am not committed in concrete, Mr. 
Mitsunaga, to making the award. My notion is that if 
there is a legitimate basis, and I presumed that there was 
1 because all of you requested them during the trial, if 
2 there's a legitimate basis for the award of attorney's 
3 fees, then I will make a determination as to the reason-
4 ableness thereof and to whom they're to be awarded. 
5 However, if there is a contest as to the appropriate-
6 ness of any award, then that may be addressed in the 4-501 
7 application. 
8 MR. MITSUNAGA: Okay, so that the Court is saying 
9 there 1s still an issue as to the entitlement and then 
10 after entitlement, the amount. 
11 THE COURT: I'm saying that while I am ruling that 
12 fees are awardable to the defen&nts and the third-party 
13 defendants, that's based simply upon the fact that 
U everybody in this case sought them during the course of the 
15 trial and I therefore assumed that there was a provision 
76 providing for the same. If there 1s a dispute to that, then 
17 that can be addressed in the application under 4-501 for 
18 a determination of reasonableness. 
19 MR. MITSUNAGA: Okay. Tiiat deals with the 
20 threshold issue of entitlement. 
21 THE COURT: I fm not precluding you from claiming 
22 that they're not entitled. That's my point. 
23 J MR. MITSUNAGA: Okay, 
24 | THE COURT: All right. If there's nothing further, 
25 (counsel, we'll be in recess, 
thereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
1 I REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 
3 
4 | STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
5 | COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
6 
7 I I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify: 
8 That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License 
9 No. 22-106796-7801, and one of the official court reporters 
10 of the state of Utah; that on the 17th day of February, 
11 199 5, I attended the within matter and reported in shorthand 
12 the proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said 
13 shorthand proceedings to be transcribed into typewriting, 
14 and the foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 9, inclusive, 
15 constitute a full, true and correct account of the same, 
16 to the best of my ability 
17 DATED AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, this 17th day of 
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CASE NUMBER 910901751 CN 
DATE 04/18/95 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION (OHS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW) DATED APRIL 11, 1995 AND NOTICE 
TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION (DEFENDANT OHS' VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES) DATED APRIL 11, 1995, THE COURT RULES 
AS FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANT OHS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IS GRANTED FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED 
IN THE SUPPORTING MEMORANDA. 
2. DEFENDANT OHS' VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR AWARD OF FEES, 
ETC. IS GRANTED FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN THE SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDA. 
3. THIS COURT DETERMINES THE FEES SOUGHT BY DEFENDANTS ARE 
REASONABLE AND NECESSARY AND APPROVES THE SAME. THIS COURT IS 
UNABLE TO RULE ON THE REASONABLENESS OF CLAIMED FEES OF THIRD-
PARTY DEFENDANTS UM AS NO DETAILED ANALYSIS FOR "PASS THROUGH" 
PURPOSES IS ON FILE. 
4. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS IS TO SUBMIT THE APPROPRIATE 
ORDER AND FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT. 
Case No: 910901751 CN 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the ¥£^ day of AcC\\ J3a5T' 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
Atty for Plaintiff 
731 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
STEPHEN R. SMITH 
Atty for Defendant 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
4TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-2006 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS 
Atty for Defendant 
39 MARKET STREET 
3RD FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-2104 
District Court Clerk 




MAY 2 i9S5 
3 ^TUxKc. C^.uiY 
Submitted By: 
Jeffrey Weston Shields, (2948) 
PURSER & EDWARDS, L.L.C. 
39 Market Street, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2104 
Telephone: (801) 532-3555 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and : 
SEON SIL SATSUDA, his wife, : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiffs, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
V, : 
HAS IN OH and MYUNG JA OH, : 
his wife, : 
Defendants, : 
HASIN OH AND MYUNG JA OH, : Civil No. 910901751 
his wife, : 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
V. : 
KEE HONG UM and SHI JA UM, : 
his wife, : 
Third-Party Defendants. : 
Trial in this matter was conducted by the Court, sitting 
without a jury, on February 14 and 15, 1995. The Plaintiffs, Wayne 
Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda, were represented by Jimi 
b 
Mitsunaga. The Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs, Hasi.n Oh and 
Myung Ja Oh, were represented by Jeffrey Weston Shields and 
Lawrence R. Dingivan. The Third-Party Defendants, Kee Hong Urn and 
Shi Ja Urn, were represented by Stephen R. Smith, Jr. and Jerald D. 
McPhee. The Court, having heard the testimonial evidence presented 
at trial, having examined the documentary evidence, having examined 
the exhibits whose relevance and admissability were stipulated to 
by the parties prior to trial or ruled on by the Court during 
trial, and having reviewed the parties7 Stipulated Statement of 
Undisputed Facts, now enters its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following findings with respect to factual 
matters at issue at the time of trial: 
1. The Third-Party Defendants acquired the Capitol Motel 
("Property") in 1982. 
2. The Third-Party Defendants made several modifications to 
the Property by hiring contractors. 
3. In 1983 the Third-Party Defendants hired a contractor and 
converted certain space on the premises of the Property into six 
additional rental rooms. The Third-Party Defendants thought that 
all work undertaken by the contractor to build the six additional 
0701698.Ird 
93-189.2 2 
rooms and paid for by them would be dene pursuant to all applicable 
codes and building permit regulations promulgated by Salt Lake 
City. 
4. The Third-Party Defendants did not become aware that the 
construction of the six additional rental rooms had not been 
performed under a Salt Lake City building permit until after the 
construction was completed. 
5. It was not until January 1990, after the Plaintiffs took 
possession of the property, that the Third-Party Defendants became 
aware that there existed zoning and building code deficiencies on 
the Property. 
6. The Third-Party Defendants sold the property to the 
Defendants on May 1, 1987 for $540,000.00 through execution of a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. At that time, the Property consisted 
of 39 units. 
7. The Third-Party Defendants did not disclose the existence 
of the additional rental units to Salt Lake City, and chose to 
renew their business license by mail. 
8. The fees for licensing a 40-unit motel were more than they 
are for a 34-unit motel. 
9. While the Third-Party Defendants owned the Property, 
numerous inspections were conducted by the Salt Lake City and 
0701698.Ird 
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County Health Department as well as the Salt Lake City Fire 
Department. The results of these inspections were satisfactory. 
10. No notice of any zoning or building code deficiencies on 
the property occurred until Lawrence Suggars, a trainee inspector, 
inspected the property in January 1990. 
11. The Plaintiffs took possession of the Property on January 
1, 1990, prior to closing. 
12. At the time they took possession of the Property, the 
Plaintiffs thought they were purchasing a 40-unit motel which 
complied with all building codes and zoning requirements. 
13. The Plaintiffs met with the Defendants, mostly on the 
Property, approximately four times prior to closing and inspected, 
on the third occasion, only four or five rental rooms, as well as 
the boiler and laundry rooms. 
14. The Plaintiffs obtained no third-party inspection though 
they had every right to obtain such an inspection pursuant to 
paragraph B of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of November 16, 
1989. 





16. As of at least January 1, 1990, some four days before 
closing, the Plaintiffs were in possession of the Property and had 
all the keys and unfettered access to the Property. 
17. During their meetings with the Defendants prior to 
closing, the Plaintiffs requested no information from Defendants or 
Defendants7 agents with regard to parking, building inspections, 
construction history and other matters. 
18. The Property's business license, reflecting 34 units 
approved for rental, hung at all pertinent times on the wall in the 
Capitol Motel office, even after the Plaintiffs acquired possession 
of the Property on January 1, 1990. 
19. The Plaintiffs did not examine the Property's business 
license until January 1, 1990, a date some four days prior to 
closing. On November 16, 1989, the Plaintiffs had executed an 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement to purchase the Property as a 40-unit 
motel for some $620,000.00. 
20. The sale of the Motel to the Plaintiffs by Defendants 
closed on January 5, 1990 by execution of closing documents which 
included an assignment to Plaintiffs of Third-Party Defendants' 




21. On February 12, 1990, the Plaintiffs were advised of the 
zoning and building code deficiencies disclosed by the Lawrence 
Suggars inspection of January 1990. 
22. The Plaintiffs obtained a zoning variance for the 
Property's parking lot at a cost of approximately $2,500.00 in 
attorney's fees. 
23. The Plaintiffs remodeled deficient rental units on the 
Property to comply with applicable Salt Lake City codes except for 
unit 35 which was permanently closed. The Plaintiffs completely 
closed certain other rental units during remodeling, an action 
which was not required by Salt Lake City. 
24. The Plaintiffs sold the Property on January 5, 1994, 
during the pendency of this case for some $860,000.00, $240,000.00 
more than their purchase price. 
25. Neither the Defendants nor the Third-Party Defendants 
were aware of any building or zoning violations, or particularly, 
the effect or meaning of such violations. 
26. The Defendants and Third-Party Defendants speak broken 
English and their understanding of the effect of claimed violations 
is lacking. The facts contained in the parties' Statement of 
Stipulated Facts, dated February 13, 1995 are accepted by the Court 




that those facts are material to matters presented at trial and to 
the extent that those Statements of Fact are not modified by the 
immediately preceding enumerated Statements of Fact. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
In light of the Statements of Fact enumerated immediately 
above and the facts included in the parties7 "Statement of 
Stipulated Facts" incorporated to the extent stated above, the 
Court makes the following conclusions of law: 
1. The Doctrine of Merger as defined and illuminated in 
Stubbs v, Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977), and Schafir v. 
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994) bars the Plaintiffs' cause 
of action for breach of warranty which was grounded in the 
provisions of the November 16, 1989 Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
The Defendants' execution and delivery of a Warranty Deed to the 
Plaintiffs on or about January 5, 1990 constituted the Defendants' 
full performance of their contractual obligations to deliver title 
to the Property to the Plaintiffs. Delivery of the Warranty Deed 
extinguished all terms of the November 16, 1989 Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement and rendered those terms unenforceable. 
2. Neither fraud nor the existence of collateral rights, both 
of which are exceptions to the Doctrine of Merger, preclude 
operation of that Doctrine in this case. The plaintiffs fail to 
0701698.Ird 
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present clear and convincing evidence that fraud tainted the 
execution of the Warranty Deed on or about January 5, 1990 and, in 
addition, the Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that any of the 
obligations the Defendants incurred under the -November 16, 1989 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement were collateral to the obligation to 
convey title to the Property to the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, none 
of the obligations the Defendants incurred under the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement survived delivery of the Warranty Deed to the 
Plaintiffs on January 5, 1990. 
3. To establish their claim of fraudulent misrepresentation 
or fraudulent concealment in the land sale transaction between the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendants, the Plaintiffs were obliged to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendants made 
representations concerning presently existing material facts which 
were false and which the Defendants knew to be false and/or made 
recklessly, in that the Defendants had insufficient information or 
knowledge upon which based those representations, yet the 
representations were made for the purpose of inducing the 
Plaintiffs to act upon them. In addition, the Plaintiffs were 
obliged to show that they did indeed act reasonably in ignorance of 
the falsity of the Defendants' representation and relied upon those 




4c Under the holding of Maack v. Resource Design, 879 P.2d 
570 (Utah App. 1994) and Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah 
App. 1994) , the Plaintiffs were obliged to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Defendants and, in turn, the Third-
Party Defendants, intentionally or actively concealed claimed 
defects in the property. This showing must be made in conjunction 
with the showing by the Plaintiffs that, after careful and 
reasonable inspection, they would not have discovered the defects 
which they" claim were intentionally or actively concealed from them 
by the Defendants. 
5. The Plaintiffs failed to establish this showing by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
6. In addition, the Plaintiffs did not establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that they reasonably relied on the allegedly 
false statements made by the defendants. 
7. In addition, the Plaintiffs failed to establish that they 
exercised reasonable diligence in verifying the Defendants7 
allegedly false statements. 
8. Because the Plaintiffs have failed to establish these 
essential elements of a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation or 
fraudulent concealment by clear and convincing evidence, the 
0701698.Ird 
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Plaintiffs have failed to establish their cause of action against 
the Defendants. 
9. For the same reasons, the Defendants have failed to 
establish their causes of action in their Third-Party Complaint. 
10. Consequently, no cause of action is found on either the 
Complaint or the Third-Party Complaint. 
11. Reasonable attorney's fees are awarded to the Defendants, 
the amount of which is to be determined by the submission of 
affidavits by the parties. Third-party Defendants' entitlement to 
attorney's fees, and liability therefore if awarded are reserved 
for further proceedings. 
DATED this £r** day of April(\ 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
J./Dennis Frederick 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the *-' day of February, 1995, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, by depositing copies thereof in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Stephen R. Smith, Esq, 
23 6 South 3 00 East 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq. 
731 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84102 
Jerald D. McPhee, Esq. 
431 South 300 East, Suite 101 
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Jeffrey Weston Shields, (2948) 
PURSER & EDWARDS, L.L.C. 
3 9 Market Street, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2104 
Telephone: (801) 53 2-3555 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and 
SEON SIL SATSUDA, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 








KEE HONG UM and SHI JA UM, 
his wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF 
COMPLAINT AND THIRD PARTY 
COMPLAINT AND JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANT OHS 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF SATSUDAS 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 910901751 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above captioned matter came before the Court, sitting 
without jury, for trial, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
District Court Judge, presiding, on February 14 and 15, 1995. 
Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel of record, Jimi 
Mitsunaga, Esq. Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs were 
represented by their counsel of record, Jeffrey Weston Shields, 
Esq. and Lawrence R. Dingivan, Esq, of and for Purser & Edwards, 
L.L.C. Third Party Defendants were represented by their counsel of 
record, Stephen R. Smith, Esq. of Mooney Associates and Jerold D. 
McPhee, Esq. The Court received evidence, heard the testimony of 
witnesses, and took the matter under advisement. On February 17, 
1995, the Court rendered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decision from the bench. Subsequent to the February 17, 1995 
decision, and pursuant to directions of the Court, the Defendants 
and Third Party Defendants filed their applications for award of 
attorney's fees upon which the Court rendered its decision by 
Minute Entry dated April 18, 1995. The Court, being duly advised 
in the premises, and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, it is now by the Court 
ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Complaint of Plaintiffs against Defendants Hasin Oh 
and Myung Ja Oh be and herewith is dismissed, with prejudice, on 
the merits, the Court finding no cause of action thereon. 
2. The Third Party Complaint against Third Party Defendants 
Kee Hong Um and Shi Ja Um be and herewith is dismissed with 
prejudice, on the merits, the Court finding no cause of action 
thereon as a result of the Court finding no cause of action on the 
Complaint. 
3. Defendants Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh are awarded their 
attorney's fees as requested against Plaintiffs Wayne Takashi 
0702033.jws 
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Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda, as specified below, the Court finding 
that the fees requested are reasonable and necessary and that an 
adequate basis in contract exists for such an award• 
4. The Court denies the Third Party Defendants7 Application 
for Attorney's Fees at this time, without prejudice, subject to 
further proceedings concerning that application. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF HASIN OH AND 
MYUNG JA OH AND AS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA AND 
SEON SIL SATSUDA IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. In the principal sum of $44,959.86; 
2. Interest shall accrue thereon until paid at the maximum 
post-judgment rate; 
3. This judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees which may be incurred in the 
collection thereon as may be shown by competent affidavit, 
DATED this A? day of Ap*i2Tl995. 
BY THE COURT 
J./ Dennis Frederick 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^-/ day of April/ 1995, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF 
COMPLAINT AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANT OHS AGAINST PLAINTIFF SATSUDAS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, by 
depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Stephen R. Smith, Esq. 
MOONEY LAW FIRM 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84101-2006 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq. 
731 E. South Temple 





Stephen R. Smith, Jr. #3015 
Attorney for third party Defendants 
Mooney Law Firm 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801)364-5635 
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In the Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
—oooOooo— 
Wayne Takashi Satsuda and 
Seon Sil Satsuda, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh, his wife, 
Defendants, 
Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh, his wife, 
third-party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Kee Hong Urn and Shi Ja Urn, his wife, 
third-party Defendants. 
Objection to Defendants' 
Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and 
Proposed Order of Dismissal 
and Judgment, and Request for 
Clarification of Minute Entry 
Case No. 910901751 
Judge Frederick 
—oooOooo— 
Comes now third party Defendants, Kee Hong Urn and Shi Ja Um, represented by their 
attorney of record, Stephen R. Smith, Jr., who submit the following objections to paragraph 11 
of the conclusions of law of Defendants' (Ohs) findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to 
paragraph four of Defendants' proposed Order of Dismissal of Complaint and Judgment in Favor 
of Defendant Ohs Against Plaintiff Satsudas for Attorney's fees. Additionally, third-party 
Defendants request the Court to clarify its minute entry of April 18, 1995 at paragraph 3 
regarding the reasonableness of the attorney's fees claimed by third-party Defendants and how 
a detailed analysis for "pass through* purposes effects their contractual right to an award of 
attorneys fees against Defendants. Having no material dispute with Defendants' statement of 
1 
facts, the Urns propose one addition finding that third-party Defendants have incurred attorneys' 
fees and costs in the sum of $56,083.60. 
Facts 
1. On February 17, 1995, at the conclusion of the Court's bench ruling herein, Stephen 
R. Smith, Jr. and Jerold D. McPhee both submitted their most recent affidavits for attorneys fees 
for third-party Defendants. Both affidavits were submitted in accordance with the requirement 
of Rule 4-505, Code of Judicial Administration. Mr. McPhee's affidavit reflected reasonable 
attorney's fees in the sum of $7,627.50 for 56.5 hours spent in the preparation and trial of this 
matter, and was accompanied by his invoice and a detailed billing sheet. Mr. Smith's affidavit 
reflected reasonable attorney's fees and costs in the sum of $48,456.10 for 461 hours of work 
and $2,356.10 in costs, and was accompanied by 70 pages of itemization of each time charge 
and cost. Total reasonable attorneys' fees in the sum of $56,083.60 were affirmed and 
documented the very moment that the Court ruled to award them to third-party Defendants. 
2. Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have challenged third-party Defendants' entitlement 
to an award of prevailing party reasonable attorneys fees against either or both of them pursuant 
to the provisions of Paragraph 15 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into between the 
parties which provides: 
Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of the covenants or 
agreements herein contained, the non-defaulting party or, should litigation be 
commenced, the prevailing party in litigation, shall be entitled to all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or 
terminating this contract, or in obtaining possession of the Property, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law. 
2 
3. Although Plaintiffs and Defendants have engaged in extensive argument regarding the 
reasonableness of Defendants' attorneys' fees, Plaintiffs have not challenged the reasonable of 
third-party Defendants' attorneys' fees; Defendants have raised third-party Defendants' 
attorneys' fees only as a justification of their own, being somewhat lower. 
4. Paragraph 11 of Defendants' conclusions of law provides "Third-party Defendants' 
entitlement to attorneys' fees, and liability therefore if awarded are reserved for further 
proceedings." The quoted language was nowhere in any of the previous proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law submitted by Defendants, and was not in the Court's bench ruling 
of February 17, 1995. 
5. On February 17, 1995 the Court ruled, commencing at page 7, line 23, of the 
Reporter's Transcript of Judge's Ruling: "Reasonable attorney's fees are awarded to the 
defendants and the third-Party defendants, the amount of which is to be determined by 
submission of affidavits pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration." 
Argument 
The source for the confusion of Defendants' findings and order is in the Courts' minute 
entry of April 18, 1995, where it determines in paragraph 3 that 
the fees sought by defendants are reasonable and necessary and approves the 
same. This Court is unable to rule on the reasonableness of claimed fees of third-
party Defendants Um as no detailed analysis for "pass through" purposes is on 
file. 
Defendant Ohs have drafted their documents to reflect that only their fees are approved, ignoring 
that third-party Defendants Urns are also defendants, and that most other references distinguish 
3 
between which defendant is being referred to, if a distinction is intended to be made. The more 
reasonable interpretation is that the fees sought by both defendants, including third-party 
Defendants, are found to be reasonable and are approved, but that a question remains as to which 
portion of third-party Defendants' fees may be passed through to Plaintiffs by Defendants. 
Third-party Defendants are clearly entided to an award of their attorney's fees as 
prevailing parties pursuant to the provisions of the real estate contract which governs the sale of 
the subject real estate. Their fees are fully documented and have not been contested by either 
opposing party. These fees should at least be awarded against Defendants and third-party 
Plaintiffs, whose action against third-party Defendants was fully non-suited. 
Defendants have prepared the findings and order to leave unresolved third-party 
Defendants' right to attorneys' fees along with the amount sought. To allow Defendants then-
fees as reasonable in the face of strong criticism by Plaintiffs while denying third-party 
Defendants their unopposed fees is inconsistent with the Court's own previous rulings, the 
contracts governing the parties, the caselaw, and logic. Third-party Defendants respectfully 
request the Court to clarify its minute entry regarding their attorneys' fees, the reasonableness 
of the amount sought, and what issues remain to be detailed for pass through analysis. 
Conclusion 
Third-party Defendants are entided by contact to an award of their reasonable attorneys' 
fees against Defendants as prevailing parties, which right the other parties have not opposed. 
The attorneys for third-party Defendants have submitted affidavits which conform to the all 
requirements for awards of attorneys fees and which are fully detailed to support the sum of 
4 
$56,083.60 incurred by third-party Defendants as both reasonable and necessary to defend this 
action. Defendants should be ordered to prepare findings and an order both expressly entitling 
third-party Defendants to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defending this 
action, and finding that the amount sought, $56,083.60 is approved and awarded as a judgment 
against third-party Plaintiffs. 
Dated this 26th day of April, 1995. 
Stephen/6. Smith, Jr 
Atto/iley for thipi^ party Defendants 
Certificate of Service by Mail 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April, 1995 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to the offices of the attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Defendants as follows: 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq. 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq. 
Purser & Edwards, P.C. 
39 Market Street, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Stephen R. Smith, Jr. #3015 
Attorney for third party Defendants 
Mooney Law Firm 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
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In the Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
—oooOooo— 
Wayne Takashi Satsuda and 
Seon Sil Satsuda, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh, his wife, 
Defendants, 
Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh, his wife, 
third-party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Kee Hong Urn and Shi Ja Urn, his wife, 
third-party Defendants. 
Third-Party Defendants' 
Motion to Open, Alter, 
or Amend Judgment 
Case No. 910901751 
Judge Frederick 
-000O000-
Comes now third party Defendants, Kee Hong Um and Shi Ja Um, represented by their 
attorney of record, Stephen R. Smith, Jr., who, pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, moves the Court to open, alter, and amend its judgment entered on May 2, 1995 for 
the reasons stated in their Objection to Defendants* Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and Proposed Order of Dismissal and Judgment, and Request for Qarification of Minute Entry 
previously filed herein. Oral argument is requested. 
Dated this 10th day of May, 1995. 
Stephen R. Si 
Attorney for ttifrd party Defendants 
Certificate of Service by Mail 
1 heiebv certify that on the 10th day of May, 1995 a true and coirect copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to the offices ot the attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Defendants as follows 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq 
Purser Edwards & Shields, L L C 
800 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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CASE NUMBER 910901751 CN 
DATE 05/09/95 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION ON SATSUDAS' AND UMS' OBJECTIONS 
TO OHS' PROPOSED FTMQXMC.g ni? FAHT ANP fnMrT.n.c;TnM.c; OF LAW AND 
PROPOSED ORDER AND^JUDGMENT DATED MAY 5, 1995J THE COURT RULES 
AS FOLLOWS: ^ - = ~ " ~" 
1. THIS COURT TS PFP.SUAPFP THAT THTPP-PAPTY PFFFNPANTg 
AR.F FNTTTT.FD TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BF PATP BY 
PT.ATNTTFFS. THE OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE DENIED AND/OR SUSTAINED ACCORDINGLY. 
2. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE 
ORDER. 
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Case No: 910901751 CN 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the ^f^ day of V T V ^ £S£L, 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct coj 
attached document to the following: 
of the 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
Atty for Plaintiff 
731 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
STEPHEN R. SMITH 
Atty for Defendant 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
4TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-2006 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS 
Atty for Defendant 
800 PARKSIDE TOWER 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
District Court Clerk 
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Jeffrey Weston Shields, (2948) 
PURSER EDWARDS & SHIELDS, L.L.C. 
800 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2340 
Telephone: (801) 532-3555 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and 
SEON SIL SATSUDA, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 








KEE HONG UM and SHI JA UM, 
his wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 910901751 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Trial in this matter was conducted by the Court, sitting 
without a jury, on February 14 and 15, 1995. The Plaintiffs, Wayne 
Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda, were represented by Jimi 
// 
Mitsunaga. The Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs, Hasin Oh and 
Myung Ja Oh, were represented by Jeffrey Weston Shields and 
Lawrence R. Dingivan. The Third-Party Defendants, Kee Hong Urn and 
Shi Ja Urn, were represented by Stephen R. Smith, Jr. and Jerold D. 
McPhee. The Court, having heard the testimonial evidence presented 
at trial, having examined the documentary evidence, having examined 
the exhibits whose relevance and admissability were stipulated to 
by the parties prior to trial or ruled on by the Court during 
trial, and having reviewed the parties' Stipulated Statement of 
Undisputed Facts, and having considered and ruled upon certain 
post-trial motions concerning the form of orders and award of 
attorney's fees now enters its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following findings with respect to factual 
matters at issue at the time of trial: 
1. The Third-Party Defendants acquired the Capitol Motel 
("Property") in 1982. 
2. The Third-Party Defendants made several modifications to 
the Property by hiring contractors. 
3. In 1983 the Third-Party Defendants hired a contractor and 




additional rental rooms. The Third-Party Defendants thought that 
all work undertaken by the contractor to build the six additional 
rooms and paid for by them would be done pursuant to all applicable 
codes and building permit regulations promulgated by Salt Lake 
City. 
4. The Third-Party Defendants did not become aware that the 
construction of the six additional rental rooms had not been 
performed under a Salt Lake City building permit until after the 
construction was completed, 
5. It was not until January 1990, after the Plaintiffs took 
possession of the property, that the Third-Party Defendants became 
aware that there existed zoning and building code deficiencies on 
the Property. 
6. The Third-Party Defendants sold the property to the 
Defendants on May 1, 1987 for $540,000.00 through execution of a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. At that time, the Property consisted 
of 39 units. 
7. The Third-Party Defendants did not disclose the existence 
of the additional rental units to Salt Lake City, and chose to 
renew their business license by mail. 
8. The fees for licensing a 40-unit motel were more than they 




9. While the Third-Party Defendants owned the Property, 
numerous inspections were conducted by the Salt Lake City and 
County Health Department as well as the Salt Lake City Fire 
Department. The results of these inspections were satisfactory. 
10. No notice of any zoning or building code deficiencies on 
the property occurred until Lawrence Suggars, a trainee inspector, 
inspected the property in January 1990. 
11. The Plaintiffs took possession of the Property on January 
1, 1990, prior to closing. 
12. At the time they took possession of the Property, the 
Plaintiffs thought they were purchasing a 40-unit motel which 
complied with all building codes and zoning requirements. 
13. The Plaintiffs met with the Defendants, mostly on the 
Property, approximately four times prior to closing and inspected, 
on the third occasion, only four or five rental rooms, as well as 
the boiler and laundry rooms. 
14. The Plaintiffs obtained no third-party inspection though 
they had every right to obtain such an inspection pursuant to 
paragraph B of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of November 16, 
1989. 





16. As of at least January 1, 1990, some four days before 
closing, the Plaintiffs were in possession of the Property and had 
all the keys and unfettered access to the Property. 
17. During their meetings with the Defendants prior to 
closing, the Plaintiffs requested no information from Defendants or 
Defendants' agents with regard to parking, building inspections, 
construction history and other matters. 
18. The Property's business license, reflecting 34 units 
approved for rental, hung at all pertinent times on the wall in the 
Capitol Motel office, even after the Plaintiffs acquired possession 
of the Property on January 1, 1990. 
19. The Plaintiffs did not examine the Property's business 
license until January 1, 1990, a date some four days prior to 
closing. On November 16, 1989, the Plaintiffs had executed an 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement to purchase the Property as a 40-unit 
motel for some $620,000.00. 
20. The sale of the Motel to the Plaintiffs by Defendants 
closed on January 5, 1990 by execution of closing documents which 
included an assignment to Plaintiffs of Third-Party Defendants' 




21. On February 12, 1990, the Plaintiffs were advised of the 
zoning and building code deficiencies disclosed by the Lawrence 
Suggars inspection of January 1990. 
22. The Plaintiffs obtained a zoning variance for the 
Property's parking lot at a cost of approximately $2,500.00 in 
attorney's fees. 
23. The Plaintiffs remodeled deficient rental units on the 
Property to comply with applicable Salt Lake City codes except for 
unit 35 which was permanently closed. The Plaintiffs completely 
closed certain other rental units during remodeling, an action 
which was not required by Salt Lake City. 
24. The Plaintiffs sold the Property on January 5, 1994, 
during the pendency of this case for some $860,000.00, $240,000.00 
more than their purchase price. 
25. Neither the Defendants nor the Third-Party Defendants 
were aware of any building or zoning violations, or particularly, 
the effect or meaning of such violations. 
26. The Defendants and Third-Party Defendants speak broken 
English and their understanding of the effect of claimed violations 
is lacking. The facts contained in the parties' Statement of 
Stipulated Facts, dated February 13, 1995 are accepted by the Court 




that those facts are material to matters presented at trial and to 
the extent that those Statements of Fact are not modified by the 
immediately preceding enumerated Statements of Fact. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
In light of the Statements of Fact enumerated immediately 
above and the facts included in the parties1 "Statement of 
Stipulated Facts" incorporated to the extent stated above, the 
Court makes the following conclusions of law: 
1. The Doctrine of Merger as defined and illuminated in 
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977), and Schafir v. 
Harrigan, 879 P. 2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994) bars the Plaintiffs' cause 
of action for breach of warranty which was grounded in the 
provisions of the November 16, 1989 Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
The Defendants1 execution and delivery of a Warranty Deed to the 
Plaintiffs on or about January 5, 1990 constituted the Defendants1 
full performance of their contractual obligations to deliver title 
to the Property to the Plaintiffs. Delivery of the Warranty Deed 
extinguished all terms of the November 16, 1989 Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement and rendered those terms unenforceable. 
2. Neither fraud nor the existence of collateral rights, both 
of which are exceptions to the Doctrine of Merger, preclude 




present clear and convincing evidence that fraud tainred the 
execution of the Warranty Deed on or about January 5, 1990 and, in 
addition, the Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that any of the 
obligations the Defendants incurred under the November 16, 1989 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement were collateral to the obligation to 
convey title to the Property to the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, none 
of the obligations the Defendants incurred under the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement survived delivery of the Warranty Deed to the 
Plaintiffs on January 5, 1990. 
3. To establish their claim of fraudulent misrepresentation 
or fraudulent concealment in the land sale transaction between the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendants, the Plaintiffs were obliged to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendants made 
representations concerning presently existing material facts which 
were false and which the Defendants knew to be false and/or made 
recklessly, in that the Defendants had insufficient information or 
knowledge upon which based those representations, yet the 
representations were made for the purpose of inducing the 
Plaintiffs to act upon them. In addition, the Plaintiffs were 
obliged to show that they did indeed act reasonably in ignorance of 
the falsity of the Defendants' representation and relied upon those 




4. Under the holding of Maack v. Resource Design, 879 P.2d 
570 (Utah App. 1994) and Schafir v. Harriganr 879 P. 2d 1384 (Utah 
App. 1994), the Plaintiffs were obliged to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Defendants and, in turn, the Third-
Party Defendants, intentionally or actively concealed claimed 
defects in the property. This showing must be made in conjunction 
with the showing by the Plaintiffs that, after careful and 
reasonable inspection, they would not have discovered the defects 
which they claim were intentionally or actively concealed from them 
by the Defendants. 
5. The Plaintiffs failed to establish this showing by clear 
&nd convincing evidence. 
6. In addition, the Plaintiffs did not establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that they reasonably relied on the allegedly 
false statements made by the defendants. 
7. In addition, the Plaintiffs failed to establish that they 
exercised reasonable diligence in verifying the Defendants' 
allegedly false statements. 
8. Because the Plaintiffs have failed to establish these 
essential elements of a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation or 




Plaintiffs have failed to establish their cause of action against 
the Defendants. 
9. For the same reasons, the Defendants have failed to 
establish their causes of action in their Third-Party Complaint, 
10. Consequently, no cause of action is found on either the 
Complaint or the Third-Party Complaint. 
11. Reasonable attorney's fees are awarded to the Defendants, 
the amount of which is to be determined by the submission of 
affidavits by the parties. 
12. Third-Party Defendants are entitled to an award of their 
reasonable attorney's fees. The Court concludes that the Third 
Party case was and is a necessary step taken by Defendants to 
defend the Complaint and the dismissal of the Third Party Complaint 
is a direct result of dismissal of the Complaint. Consequently, 
the Court finds and concludes that Third Party Defendants' 
attorneys fees are to be passed through to and awarded directly 
against Plaintiffs. The amount of Third-Party Defendants' Fees 
shall be determined by submission of affidavits and in accordance 
with Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this H \day of Mejs 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Jy Dennis Frederick 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
// tb I hereby certify that on the //y day of May, 1995, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing FIRST AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, by depositing copies thereof in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Stephen R. Smith, Esq. 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq. 
731 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84102 
Jerold D. McPhee, Esq. 
431 South 300 East, Suite 101 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and 
SEON SIL SATSUDA, his wife, 
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF 
COMPLAINT AND THIRD PARTY 
COMPLAINT AND JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANT OHS 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF SATSUDAS 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 910901751 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above captioned matter came before the Court, sitting 
without jury, for trial, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
District Court Judge, presiding, on February 14 and 15, 1995. 
Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel of record, Jimi 
Mitsunaga, Esq. Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs were 
i?s 
represented by their counsel of record, Jeffrey Weston Shields, 
Esq. and Lawrence R. Dingivan, Esq. of and for Purser & Edwards, 
L.L.C. Third Party Defendants were represented by their counsel of 
record, Stephen R. Smith, Esq. of Mooney Associates and Jerold D. 
McPhee, Esq. The Court received evidence, heard the testimony of 
witnesses, and took the matter under advisement. On February 17, 
1995, the Court rendered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decision from the bench. Subsequent to the February 17, 1995 
decision, and pursuant to directions of the Court, the Defendants 
and Third Party Defendants filed their applications for award of 
attorney's fees upon which the Court rendered its decision by 
Minute Entry dated April 18, 1995. The Court also considered and 
ruled upon other post-trial motions concerning the form of orders 
and Third Party Defendants' attorney's fees. The Court, being duly 
advised in the premises, and having heretofore entered its First 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is now by the 
Court 
ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1» The Complaint of Plaintiffs against Defendants Hasin Oh 
and Myung Ja Oh be and herewith is dismissed, with prejudice, on 
the merits, the Court finding no cause of action thereon. 
2. The Third Party Complaint against Third Party Defendants 
Kee Hong Urn and Shi Ja Urn be and herewith is dismissed with 




thereon as a result of the Court finding no cause of action on the 
Complaint. 
3. Defendants Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh are awarded their 
attorney's fees as requested against Plaintiffs Wayne Takashi 
Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda, as specified below, the Court finding 
that the fees requested are reasonable and necessary and that an 
adequate basis in contract exists for such an award. 
4. The Court awards the Third Party Defendants1 reasonable 
attorney's fees at this time subject to further proceedings 
concerning the amount to be awarded which shall be the subject of 
a further order and judgment. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF HASIN OH AND 
MYUNG JA OH AND AS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA AND 
SEON SIL SATSUDA IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. In the principal sum of $44,959.86; 
2. Interest shall accrue thereon until paid at the maximum 
post-j udgment rate; 
3. This judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees which may be incurred in the 
collection thereon as may be shown by competent affidavit. 
DATED this 6\^ day of Hop, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
L : 
Dennis Frederick 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the [iff day of May, 1995, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF 
COMPLAINT AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANT OHS AGAINST PLAINTIFF SATSUDAS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, by 
depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Stephen R. Smith, Esq. 
MOONEY LAW FIRM 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84101-2006 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq. 
731 E. South Temple 
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CASE NUMBER 910901751 CN 
DATE 06/09/95 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION DATED JUNE 7, 1995 AND NOTICE 
TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
OPEN, ALTER, OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS' AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DATED JUNE 8, 1995, THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER AND JUDGMENT IS DENIED 
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION. 
2. THE AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER AND JUDGMENT ARE EXECUTED JUNE 9, 1995. 
3. THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO OPEN, ETC^J^_GRANTED 
TO THE EXTENT THAT JUDGMENT IS AWARDED THIRD-EARTY^DEFEND|NTS 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS FOR FEES IN THE AMOUNT 
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN THE SUPPORTING' 
4. COUNSEL FOR THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS TO PREPARE 
SUPPLEMENTAL PERTINENT FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER & JUDGMENT. 
Case No: 910901751 CN 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the day of vSvX\a VP& . 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
Atty for Plaintiff 
731 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
STEPHEN R. SMITH 
Atty for Defendant 
5 0 WEST BROADWAY 
4TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-2006 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS 
Atty for Defendant 
800 PARKSIDE TOWER 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
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- ' ^i-ii-.QS 
JIMI MITSUNAGA #2279 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
731 East South Temple 
Salt lake City, UT 84102-1221 
Telephone: (801)322-3551 
Facsimile: (801)322-3554 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and 
SEON SIL SATSUDA, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, -C^yaJLyA 
v. 
HASIN OH and HYUNG JA OH, 
his wife, 
Defendants. -<lffdlu. 
HASIN OH and MYUNG JA OH, 
his wife, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v.. 
KEE HONG UM and SHI JA UM, 
his wife, 
Third Party Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 910901751 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
1. Notice is hereby given that the plaintiffs and appellants, 
Wayne Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda, through Jimi 
Mitsunaga, attorney for the plaintiffs and appellants, appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeal the final judgment of the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick entered in this matter on Mav 5, 1995. 
>y 
2. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED June 5. 1995. 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATION 
M.-.. • '- of the foregoing Notice of Appeal this 5 day of 
June , :f-'-j LU UIC - a iui tnc Defendants and Third Party 
Plaintiffs and Third Party Defendants, respectively, at: 
MR. JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS 
PURSER & EDWARDS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
89090 PARKSIDE TOWER 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111-2340 
MR. STEVEN R. SMITH, ESQ. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MOONEY LAW FIRM 
50 WEST BROADWAY, FOURTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101-2006 
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OH, MYUNG JA 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D A TTY 
DEFENDANT 
MINI JTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 9109017 51 CN 
•DATE 07/07/95 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT 
OF, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDED AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS DATED JULY 7, 1995, THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' 
PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT, ETC. IS DENIED FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN 
THE OPPOSING MEMORANDA. 
2. THE SUBMITTED SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ETC. ARE EXECUTED JULY 7, 1995. 
Case No: 910901751 CN 
I certify that on t: i 
1 sent by first cj •: r\:i .".,!& ind cor. y:t 




Atty for Plaintiff 
731 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 
STEPHEN R. SMITH 
Atty for Defendant 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
4TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-2006 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS 
Atty for Defendant 
8 00 PARKSIDE TOWER 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
District Court Clerk 




JIMI MITSUNAGA *2279 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
731 East South Temple 
Salt lake City. UT 84102-1:: I 
Telephone: (801)322-3551 
Facsimile: (801) 322-3554 
IN THE THIRD Jl'DlOlAl ONIRIC 
GOLN'n. ST. 
ILiS 
95 JUL SO Fii I : - > 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and 
SEON SIL SATSUDA, his wife. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
V.. 
HASIN OH and HYUNG JA OH, 
his wife. 
Defendants and Appelees 
HASIN Oh " • '* 
his wife. 
Third Parry Plaintiffs. 
V. 
KEE HONG UM and SHI J A UM. 
his wife, 
Third Parw Defendants. 
l.'Ul K 1 IN VNP \-^\i 
TE OF LI"AH 
IN. r 
AMENDED NOTICE Ob 
APPEAL 
Civil No. 9109017. 
Judse J. Dennis Frederick 
1. .Amended Notice of Anou! Nom.c is hereby given thac the plaintiff and 
appellants. Wayne Takashi Satsuda and Son Sil Sau-uda. his wife, through Jimi 
Mitsunaga. attorney, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the finai judgment w ih • 
Honorable J Dunni:; Fr.'derioL -iik:^ I i> lu h r a Amended Order or Dismissal oi 
Complaint and Tliird Party Complaint and judgment :n :awr of the defendant against the 
plaintiffs. Satsudas, for attorney's feels rendered on ' r--. yy5. 
2. "" • -real was filed on , ....- . :Q Q5. appeahng the judgment 
rendered on Mav 5, 1995. 
3. The ; i p p e a l < :o:st s b< )tid 1 ias i )eei i * luly postei i v ti h i I it :: < l i e : k at i hi : ( l o i u: t . 
4. The Tnai Ji idge has entered a minute entry dated June 9, 1.995 wherein the 
Court instructed the Third Pany Defendant to prepare a Supplemental Order of Dismissal 
on the issue of die Third Party Defendants' Attorney's Fees. 
5. The Supplemental Order has not yet been executed by the Court. 
6. The plai i in ffs/appeilai its < lesi re to pi irsi le their i: ignis to ; ippeal * )i i all pnor 
judgments rendered by die Tnai Court in the above enuded matter. 
Dated this 10 dav of Julv, 1995. 
Attorney for the plaintiff^'appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Amended Notice of Appeal this !: .—• Tulv, 
1995 by LI. S. m a i l postage prepaid to the attorneys for the defendant/appellees a::d l~o;:\: 
Pa rry defendants at: 
Mr. Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq. 
Attorney for the Defendants 
PURSER & EDWARDS, L.L.C. 
8900 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111-2340 
Mr. Stephen R. Smith, Jr. 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants 
MOONEY LAW FIRM 
50 West Broadway, 4th Hoor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2; 
2 
Tnira Judjcia; Dinner 
JUL 7-1995 
Stephen R. Smith, Jr. #3015 
Attorney for third party Defendants 
C/O Mooney Law Firm 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (301)364-5635 
In the Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
—oooOooo— 
Wayne Takashi Satsuda and 
Seon Sil Satsuda, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh, his wife, 
Defendants, 
Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh, his wife, 
third-party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Kee Hong Um and Shi Ja Um, his wife, 
third-party Defendants. 
Supplemental Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Assessment of Third 
Party Defendants' Attorneys' 
Fees Against Plaintiffs 
Case No. 910901751 
Judge Frederick 
—oooOooo— 
Third Party Defendants' motion to open, alter, or amend judgment regarding their 
attorneys' fees came on for decision by the Court without hearing on June 9, 1995. Plaintiffs' 
counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, filed a written response, as did Defendants' and third party Plaintiffs' 
counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields. No party submitted additional evidence for consideration by 
the Court. Based upon the arguments and authorities cited by counsel and the record before the 
Court, the Court now makes and enters the following supplemental findings of fact and 
1 
conclusions of law which shall be supplemental to the first amended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law already signed and entered herein. 
Supplemental Findings of Fact 
1. With the dismissal of third party Plaintiffs' action against them with prejudice, third 
party Defendants have prevailed against third party Plaintiffs. 
2. The Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into by third party Defendants as Sellers 
and third party Plaintiffs as Buyers, and later assumed by Plaintiffs, provides in paragraph 15 
that "the prevailing party in litigation, shall be entitled to all costs and expenses, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee" for pursuing any remedy provided by the Contract "or by applicable 
law." 
3. The Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into by third party Defendants as sellers 
and third party Plaintiffs as buyers, and later assumed by Plaintiffs, provides in paragraph 12, 
regarding expenses of the property, that". . . Buyer agrees to repay Seller upon demand all such 
sums so advanced and paid by Seller together with interest thereon from date of payment of said 
sums at the rate of the greater of (1%) or one percent (1.0%) per month until paid . . . " 
4. Paragraph 3b of the Assignment of the Uniform Real Estate Contract obligates the 
Plaintiffs, as assignees, to hold harmless the Defendants, as assignors, from "any and all actions, 
suits, costs, damages, claims and demands whatsoever arising by reason of an act or omission 
of the assignees." 
5. Third party Defendants' costs and attorneys fees necessarily and reasonably incurred 
to defend against Defendants' third party action were "costs, claims, and demands" upon 
Defendants arising by reason of an act or omission of Plaintiffs, to wit: this action initiated by 
Plaintiffs and requiring commencement of the third party action. 
6. On February 17, 1995 Stephen R. Smith, Jr. and Jerold D. McPhee each submitted 
affidavits and billing records in support of costs and reasonable attorneys fees in the sum of fifty-
six thousand one hundred twenty-six dollars and seventy-seven cents ($56,126.77) necessarily 
incurred by third party Defendants in the defense of this matter. Concurrently, copies of these 
affidavits and supporting records were hand-delivered to opposing counsel. 
7. Neither opposing counsel for Plaintiffs nor Defendants and third party Plaintiffs have 
submitted any evidence or argument disputing the reasonableness of the amount of fees sought 
or the nature of the work done to earn these fees. 
8. The nature of the work performed by the attorneys for third party Defendants in this 
matter was prolonged and reasonably complicated. 
9. The number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, in excess of 516, are 
substantiated by the billing records submitted with the affidavits and have not been contested by 
either opposing party. 
10. The fees sought are reasonable for comparable legal services, being within a few 
thousand dollars of the fees awarded Defendants and third party Plaintiffs. 
11. Based upon the undisputed and uncontroverted evidence on record before the Court, 
as of February 17, 1995, third party Defendants incurred necessary and reasonable costs and 
attorneys fees in the sum of fifty-six thousand one hundred twenty-six dollars and seventy-seven 
cents ($56,126.77). 
3 
Supplemental Conclusions of Law 
1. Third party Defendants' attorneys fees affidavits satisfy each of the requirements of 
Rule 4-505 of the Code of Judicial Administration regarding the legal basis of the award, the 
nature of the work performed by the attorneys, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim 
to judgment, and in affirming the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services. 
2. Pursuant to paragraph 15 of the uniform real estate contract, third party Defendants 
are entided to an award against Defendants and third party Plaintiffs of all their costs and 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred in defending this action. 
3. Pursuant to their Assignment of Contract and hold harmless agreement with Plaintiffs, 
Defendants and third party Plaintiffs are entided to an award of the fees incurred by third party 
Defendants as a cost to be assigned directiy against Plaintiffs. 
4. By the contracts governing their respective rights and obligations in the subject 
property, third party Defendants are entided to recover judgment directiy against Plaintiffs, 
jointly and severally, for their costs and attorneys fees reasonably incurred in the sum of fifty-six 
thousand one hundred twenty-six dollars and seventy-seven cents ($56,126.77). 
5. Said attorneys fees are an obligation created under the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
entered into between the parties, and as such are an expense of the property subject to accrual 
of contract interest at the rate of one percent (1 %) per month until paid. 
6. And it is further concluded that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or 
otherwise as shall be established by affidavit. 
4 
Dated this \ ' day of July, 1995. 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of June, 1995 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to the offices of the attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Defendants as follows: 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq. 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq. 
Purser Edwards & Shields, L.L.C 
800 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2340 
c 
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Stephen R. Smith, Jr. #3015 
Attorney for third party Defeni 
C/O Mooney Law Firm 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801)364-5635 
v
 ^—•*-• ' *"" Truro •.'•j--J:c!*"« ^i^ncA 
By-
JUL 7 1995 
rSALT^KECOLh\? 
In the Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
—oooOooo— 
Wayne Takashi Satsuda and 
Seon Sil Satsuda, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh, his wife, 
Defendants, 
Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh, his wife, 
third-party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Kee Hong Um and Shi Ja Um, his wife, 
third-party Defendants. 
Supplemental Judgment of 
of Third Party Defendants' 
Attorneys' Fees Awarded 
Against Plaintiffs 
2:0 2- Afns 




Third Party Defendants' motion to open, alter, or amend judgment regarding their 
attorneys' fees came on for decision by the Court without hearing on June 9, 1995. Plaintiffs' 
counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, filed a written response, as did Defendants' and third party Plaintiffs' 
counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields. The Court, being duly advised in the premises, and having 
heretofore entered its Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding 
Assessment of Third Party Defendants' Attorneys Fees Against Plaintiffs, it is now by the Court 
Ordered As Follows: 
1. Third party Defendants Kee Hong Um and Shi Ja Um are awarded their attorney's 
fees as requested against Plaintiffs Wayne Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda, as specified 
I ? 1 
below, the Court finding that the fees requested are reasonable and necessary and that an 
adequate basis in contract exists for such an award. 
Based upon the foregoing, Judgment in favor of Kee Hong Um and Shi Ja Um and 
as against Plaintiffs Wayne Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda is entered as follows: 
1. In the principal sum of $56,126.77; 
2. Interest shall accrue thereon at the contract rate of one percent (1 %) per month until 
paid; and 
3. This judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's 
fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit. 
Dated this of July, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
2 
Certificate of Service by Mail 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of June, 1995 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to the offices of the attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Defendants as follows: 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq. 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq. 
Purser Edwards & Shields, L.L.C. 
800 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2340 
^Stephen R. Smith, Jr. 
Tab 21 
Thfr^ .;j:^;o,af S t r i c t 
JIMI MITSUNAGA #2279 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
731 East South Temple 
Salt lake City, UT 84102-1221 
Telephone: (801)322-3551 
Facsimile: (801) 322-3554 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA and 
SEON SEL SATSUDA, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
HASIN OH and HYUNG JA OH, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Appellees 
HASIN OH and MYUNG JA OH, 
his wife, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
V. 
KEE HONG UM and SHI JA UM, 
his wife, 
Third Party Defendants. 
1. The Second Amended Notice of Appeal is hereby given that the 
plaintiffs/appellants, Wayne Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda, his wife, through Jimi 
Mitsunaga, attorney of record, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals on the final judgment 
of dismissal of the Honorable J. Dennis Fredericks entered as the Supplemental Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law regarding assessment of the Third Party Defendants 
attorney's fees against the plaintiff, rendered on July 7, 1995. 
2. The First Nodce of Appeal was filed on June 5, 1995, appealing the judgment 
rendered on May 5, 1995. 
JUL 7 7 19S5 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
9y. 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE 
OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 910901751 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
3. The Amended Notice of Appeal was rendered on July 10, 1995, appealing the 
First Amended Order of the Dismissal of the Complaint and Third Party defendant's 
Affidavit and judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs for attorney's 
fees rendered on June 9, 1995. 
4. The Appeal Court Bond has been duly posted with the Clerk of the Court. 
5. The plaintiffs/appellants desire to pursue their rights to appeal on all prior 
judgments rendered by the Trial Court in the above entided mattg 
Dated this 27 day of July, 1995. 
-flMMfrSUNAGA^ 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
MATT,FT) a copy of the foregoing Second Amended Notice of Appeal by U. S. 
mail, postage prepaid, this 27 day of July, 1995 to: 
Mr. Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq. 
Attorney for the Defendants 
PURSER & EDWARDS, L.L.C. 
8900 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2340 
Mr. Stephen R. Smith, Jr. 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants 
MOONEY LAW FIRM 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
2 
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R E A L T O R ' 
mis is a <egaiiy Dinding contract Read both'front an3<b^ck^a7eTCl*^ 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE . FF$. ^ ^ J j g l ^ . ^ -
The undersigned Buyer Hi Si n OP AnJL /Hj/tf/lrf JTA rfh v » f \ , ; i ; r M V ^ U JA'^K* 
—,^ _ ,
 f 1—rtrrhd- hereby deposits with ^Agent/Broker'Company* 
BARNBSTJAONBY the amount of F ' ^ t ThCOSd^XCi a»Cl JfU//OF> d 
\tct£ collars ($. £~> OQIX )t in the form of 




OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1 PROPERTY D E S C R I P T I O N 
at t119 4>Q. ^JMf> S-t 
The above stared EARNEST MONEY isgiven to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated 
J ^ . / Y CflKf ( 2 / V o u n t y oi ^ 3 & /fitf£ . in the City of. ^ C o 
' ^aov 
_ Utah, 
subject to anvirestrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way government patents or state deeds of record 
approved by Buyer in accordance with Section 4 Said property is more particularly described as <3 </O Uh tT /V\o1e L 
called C^pttoL tnoifL 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
^ I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY ' C o m m e r c i a l D Residential Q Other 
Q U N I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY D Vacant Lot Q Vacant Acreage D Other 
(a) Included items. Unless excluded below this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the 
property plumbing, heating, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and 
bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed 
television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener automatic garage door opener and transmitter(s), fencing, trees and shrubs The 
following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title 
(b) Excluded Items. The followingatems are specifically excluded from this sale 
7> 1/ 
(cL Connections: Seller represents that the above property is connected to 
iSpublic sewer, Q septic tank, Q municipal water, Dwe l l , D natural gas, D irrigation water/secondary system, D other sanitary system 
(specify) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
(d) Utilities, Improvements, and Other Rights. The property presently has or is served by the following 
jB""public water main, D well, Q water stub in, D sewer main, O private water main, Q gas main, ^electr ic distribution line T Q , gas 
distribution line, D telephone, D ingress and egress by private easement, Ddedicatedroad, Dcrops, Osidewalk, Dcurb & gutter, Owater 
rights, specify . , Q mineral rights, specify , D other, specify .. . 
(e) Survey, A certified survey O shall be furnished at the expense of ^-/p. 
prior to closing, D shall not be furnished 
(f) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section (d) above accepts-it in its present physical 
condition, except - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . 
ztttt 
2 P >URCHASE PF RICE A N D F I N A N C I N G . The total purchase price for the j 
• — Do/far 
property is F>vr Uiffid'red - / l - f f iy -&LoU$3h4 
s (s J C - C J J , £A vO w ) which sha 11 Vejpaid as follows* 
£To O O 
4S. ooO 
which represents the aforedesenbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
representing the approximate balance of CASH p 0 W N PAYMENT at closing > 4 ^ S j & B ^ ^ # ^ 
. _ . . ••} > *v<-o" - X''* * 
representing the approximate Daiance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estafelfdTltract or other encumbrance to be 
.67)0,000 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at 
which includes 
% per annum with monthly payments of $__ 
O principal, Q interest, Q taxes. O insurance ' "* ° ^ ; ' >q_M * J 
t> i .»• 
rnother 
imbrance to be assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at / <P °^ per annum" wltn morimTTpayments of 
I—•y>/^ZnS » . ' _ i - — - j which m c k ^ e ^ / jS^prjncipal?!?^ interest; Ortaxes; D 'insurance. 
T ^0*6L£*X*s CAs?ri*r ^ ^ • ) f ^ . | i ^ r . >> i . n j tf' . \i'U a 
representing balance, if any, mcludjng^eftuancing, to be paid as in rtn w<^ ^  \2» l >. • • "T'» . . i . />U"'^ >l, v ' i» ' ; • ; 
encu brance,
tgage, trust 
: / d 
$50,000 
/py* M^pd.^
 fiufx!ul guj&WL y*y*nMz£ »'&v;e>v& ^ ^ '^ui^UvO.^ 
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
smmltment is'not obtained within ateasonable time, this Agreement is voidable at the optiorvof Seller, ^'ja\e^^^^\p^^^Mi^ 
FHA, VA or special conventional financing is contemplatedyfe^Henaarees to oav the lesser nf _'_ • » Hi.cr^iunt nmnt^'or 6 l 
W& tlo\<» j^Phv j f - tyh i j ^ f r i - ?> f+ttkfan* < $1 
ih\sAflreemertlinvolvas fhavn^Qiimnfmn nf an <w,^*.«-. I««-J — 
agr  p y o .discou  pom s'  $ 
4. \ j l N S Pj:CTjOflLO ,F. .Jj.JjLE^\A/i th i n'«V'' » : j " days after.acceptance of.th's offer;S"pJlef^hai! provide Buyer with either acommitm.ept^oi>titfe|j 
insurance or an abstract of/title brought current>with an attorney's opinion. Buyer shall have a period of- L__Jdays after receipt thereof to 
examine and accept. in3uyer,does no;; accept, Bu^^ ^ 
•
;
^ e pericjd.*^ escrow at closiQg,tfota^ 
I be. r e t u r n e d ; ^ ' ' ' -v -.<•*.••• »•:....:• ,.*•*«•, ' .•.--
,<*\> 





 'Off ft?m?nf ••jt 
6. SELLER W A R R A N T I E S . Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the 
property which has net or will not be remedied prior tc closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or 
other encumbrances of any nature shall.be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing/heating, air conditioning and ventilating 
systems, electrical system, and appliancesshall be soupa*o/in#satisfactory working condition at closing. Exceptions to the above shall be limited to the 
following: 
7. SPECIAL C O N S I D E R A T I O N S A N D CONTINGENCIES 
contingencies which must be satisfied prior to closing 
U-, 
8. C L O S I N G 
mjtirt^ This offer is. made subject to the following special conditions and/or 
OF SALE.. Tms>Qreement snail be closed on oroefore' 
•e <*-<*•' ± ,19 Z3 at a reasonable location to be designated 
by Seller, subject to Paragraph K on the reverse side hereof. Upon demand. Buyer artel Seller shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents 
necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with this AqreemenrP/orations set forth in Paragraph.L on reverse side, shall^he made as 
, 4
- * « ^ C/o /^Af- shall lie Jt-itUer •C/i/) ,ht Pi " ' 
T cj 
of D date of possession J p date of closing D other 
3 s ^ « / o f] JIX^^JL C ^ x ^ V t - C ^ «nrv .-.<*? err 
9. P O S S E S S I O N . Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer oi 
lO^rLf shc*jl fie rWfr* 
10. GENERAL P R O V I S I O N S . 
Agreement by reference. 
* # -
unless extended by mutual agreement of parties 
Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provisions on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this 
11 . A G R E E M E N T T O PURCHASE A N D TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. 
conditions. Seller shall have until (AM/PM) , 19 
the Agent shall retu/n the EARNEST MONEY to the Buyer. 
2Mi " 
Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and 
__ to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shajl lapse and 
/ / 
DATE SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
, - • - & 
v~ f *i s. 
CHECK ONE 
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE 
3 Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the termsand conditions specified above. 
COUNTER OFFER 
1 Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECTTO the exceptions or modifications or specified in the attached Addendum and presents said 
:OUNTER OFFER far Buyer's acceptance. 
£ Z ^ i i 1 _ SIGNATURE OF SELLER J// x )ATE 
'1ME . (AM-PM) 
^*?rC i^/<- y/f^( — 
Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer.-'. 
REJECTION 
.-(Seller's Initials) 
A G R E E M E N T T O PAY REAL ESTATE C O M M I S S I O N 
HECK ONE 
I This property is listed by 
nd a real estate commission shall be paid in accordance with 
. Listing Agent/Broker Company, 
ency Agreement. The Selling Agent/Broker Company is 
real estate commission of. 
_ Listing and Selling Agent/Broker. Comparvy;; 
as consideration as been authorized to offer this property for sale and Seller agr 
ir its efforts in procuring Buyer. Said commission shall be nayable at closing or upon Seller's default on this Agreement, whichever occurs first. TheN 
mount or due date thereof cannot be changed without the prior consent of the Listing and Selling Agent/Broker Company. 
E SIGNATURE OF SELLER 
D O C U M E N T RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Bu* er and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures {One of the followi ng alternatives must 
therefore be completed) 
A D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures 
SIGNATURE OF SELLER SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
Date Date 
Date Date 
B Q I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on 19 , by 
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller O Buyer Sent by 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(refer to item 10 on REVERSE sxje) 
A COUNTER OFFERS Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and if attached hereto shall incorporate all the provisions 
of this Agreement not expressly modified or excluded therein 
B D E F A U L T / I N T E R P L E A D E R A N D ATTORNEY'S FEES In the event of default by Buyer Seller may elect to either retain the earnest 
money as liquidated damages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the 
covenants or agreements herein contained the defaulting party shall pay ail costs and expenses including a reasonable attorney s fee which may 
arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law whether such 
remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the Agent/Broker company holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an 
Interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein the Buyer and Seller agree that the defaulting party 
chall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney s fees incurred by the Agent/Broker Company in bnnging such action 
C C O N D I T I O N OF WELL Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has to the best of Sellers knowledge provided an 
adequate supply of water and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right 
D C O N D I T I O N OF SEPTIC TANK Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is to the best of Seller s knowledge in good 
working order and Seller has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards 
E EXIST ING T E N A N T LEASES If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer within five (5) 
working days from the date of this Agreement a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property Unless written 
objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent within five (5) working days thereafter Buyer shall take title subject to such leases If objection is 
made within such five (5} day period Seller shall have ten (10) working days from date of receipt of said objection to remedy such objection If not so 
remedied within the stated time this Agreement shall be null and void 
F C H A N G E S D U R I N G T R A N S A C T I O N During the pendency of this Agreement. Seller agte.es that no changes in any existing leases shall 
be made nor new leases entered into nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the 
Buyer 
G BISK OF LOSS!? All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the 
property between the date hereof and the date of closing by reason of fire vandalism flood earthquake,*or a*dts of God and the cost to repair such 
damage shall exceed ten percent (10%) of the purchase price of the property Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller 
agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten 
percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to 
closing* this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
H A C C E L E R A T I O N CLAUSE Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes mortgages deed of trustor 
real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such mstrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the e^ent of sale If any such docurnent so provides and holder does not waive the same or 
unconditionally appYoVethe^alerthen within five {5) days after notice of nonwaivenordisapprovalbr)orrthe date of closing whichever is earlier Buyer 
shall have the*bption to d e c l a r e r s Agreement null and void by giving notice to Seller or SellerVagent In such case all earnest money received under 
this Agreement shall be returned to buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said 'Due on Sale clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, 
alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void 
I TITLE I N S U R A N C E If title insurance is elected Seller authorizes the Listing Agent/Broker Company to order a preliminary commitment for 
tandard form^VLTA policy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance cornpany as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall 
contain no exceptions ojtheMhani,hose provided for in said standard form, and the encumbrances 0£defqcts excepted under the final contract of sale If 
title cannot be made solnsura^lhro^ugh'a^ escrow (agreement at closing, th^arne^rr ion^(St j l i l^n le |s f BuYer elects to waive such defects or 
encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge 
vocation, present^yaluo;,future valued Income therefrom or as to Its'prc<iuctron;^^ef^cxe^t?theJproperty in "as \s**xon3ition subject?t?Seller,s 
j!warranjies as outlmed^pjSecti.oq 6, In thaevent Buyer desires any additional Jns^c i^on^ said inspections shall bejallowecl by Seljer but arranged fof 
iq#d $a]d by j3uyer Jf.size or square footage is a material consideration in making this purchase, it Is advised that Buyer personally measure or verify lot 
or improvement dimensions 
K. CLOSING-UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of 
transport, strikes, fire, flood.ior extreme weather, governmental regulations, or acts of God or similar occurrences; therMhe closing date shall be 
extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fourteen (14) days beyond the closing date provided herein. 
"Closing" shall mean the'date on which all necessary instruments are signed and delivered by all parties to the transaction 
L CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-ha'f (1 /2) of the escrow closing fee, unless this sale is FHA VA or conventionally 
financed, in which case fees shall be paid according to FHA. VA or conventional lending regulations Costs of providing title'insurance or an abstract 
brought current shall be paid hy Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents and interests on 
assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be 
assigned to Buyer at closing. 
M ASSUMED OBLIGATIONS. If the property is subject to an existing contract, mortgage, deed of trust or other encumbrance which either 
the Seller or the Buyer is to continue to pay. then the Seller or Buyer agrees to pay the same in accordance with its terms, and. upon default, the other 
shall have the right to make any payments necessary to cure said default, and the payments so made, together with interest at the rate of 18% per 
annum thereon, shall be immediately due and owing to the party making the same. 
N REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of 
defects other than those excepted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may 
transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, containing Seller s assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a 
new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real estate contract therein 
0 AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this 
Agreement on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
P AGENT'S REPRESENTATIONS. Seller and Buyer acknowledge that neither the Selling or Listing Agent/Broker Company has made any 
representations or warranties concerning the condition of the property, boundary lines or size. Buyer s financing ability, or any other matter 
concerning the property or the parties, unless otherwise noted herein or in writing separately 
Q. AGENCY DISCLAIMER. Selling Agent/Broker Company may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller 
R TIME IS OF ESSENCE. Time is of the essence in the Agreement 
S ABROGATION. Execution of a final real estate contract, if any, shall abrogate this Agreement 
T. COMPLETE AGREEMENT - NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and 
supersedes and cancels any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no 
verbal agreements which modify or affect this agreement 
THIS IS THE APPROVED FORM OF THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION JULY 1. 1983 
Tab 23 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y C O R P O R A T I O N 
DEPARTMENT OF BUILDIN3 AND HOUSING SERVICES 
451 South State Street, Roan 406 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Date Issued February 12, 1990 
Cert. Mail No. * 
NOTICE AND ORDER 
TO: *P 113 668 611 
Capital MDtel 
1749 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
*P 113 668 612 
Vfetyne T. Satsuda 
328 Ivy Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
RE: 1749 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah / Sidwell Number 16-18-304-004 
N3HCK: Notice is hereby given that the subject property is found to be in violation of Salt 
Lake City Building and Housing Ordinances necessary to iraintain the life, health, safety and 
general welfare of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City* This Notice is pursuant to an inspecti 
on which was conducted on January 31, 1990 SEE INSPECTION REPORT. 
ORDER: You are hereby ordered to correct these deficiencies within thirty (30) days, 
TO REPAIR: 
1. Camence the required work within five (5) days, and complete the required work 
within thirty (30) days frcm service of this Notice and Order. 
2. Obtain required permits for repair before starting the work. 
OR: Secure the building by one of the following methods: 
A. Insuring that the building retrain secured by having all doors locked and all 
windows closed and intact with all other openings effectively closed. 
B. Obtain a boarding permit and board your building and clean grounds as per 
requirements of city ordinance within ten (10) days. 
FAILURE TO COMPLY: 
IF YOU FAIL TO OBEY THIS ORDER WITHIN THE TIME ALLOTTED, THIS DEPARTMENT IS EMPOWERED TO 
EAKE THE F0LDCWIN3 ACTIONS: 
—File a Certificate of Noncompliance to be recorded against the property, 
—Order the building vacated and posted to prevent further occupancy, 
—Cause the building to be repaired, with the costs charged to the cwner(s), 
—Initiate criminal action against the person(s) to whan this Order is directed, 
—Have the building(s) boarded, 
—Remove all trash and debris, and/or 
—File a lien with the county recorder for the cost incurred plus $170 
administrative fee at the owners expense. 
tTGKT TO APPEAL: 
Any person having any record, title, or legal interest in this building may appeal this 
Jotioe and Order. Obtain forms from Room 406 and appeal in writing to the Housing Advisory 
ind Appeals Board within thirty (30) days frcm date of service of this Notice and Order, 
failure to appeal within the time specified will constitute a waiver of all rights to an 
idrninistrative hearing in this natter. 









NOTICE OF DEFICIENCIES 
Property inspected , 1749 South State Street , Date of inspection January 31, 1990 
Salt lake City, Utah 
The inspection revealed that the following conditions were not in ccnpliance with the 
requirements of the following codes i 
X Uniform Housing Code (UHC) Uniform Code for Abatement of Dangerous Buildings (UCADB) 
Salt Lake City Ordinance (STOP) 
The deficiencies indicate that the following permits must be obtained before repairs are 
started:_ 
X Buildirxj X Electrical Mechanical X Plumbing Board & Secure 
Licensed contractors are required to obtain the following permits i 
X- Building JC_ Electrical Mechanical JC_ Plunibing 
For permit information, please call 535-7751. 
Code Violation EXTERIOR INSPECTION 
UHC 1001 (m) Handrails are missing. 
UHC 1001 (m) The corridors must be of one hour fire resistive construction 
(existing plaster or 1/2 gypsum wall board in good condition will be 
acceptable). All doors mast be solid wood doors not less than 1 1/3" thick 
and maintained self closing. These provisions do not apply if an approved 
au tana tic sprinkler system is provided for all corridors, stairs, exits, and 
other cannon areas. 
Cede Violation INTERIOR INSPBCTIOf 
UHC 1001 (e,f) Units 1-7 have been converted to units with cooking facilities without 
conforming to electrical and plumbing requirements and must be brought up to 
code, open electric, improper vents, traps, and waist lines. 
UHC 1001 (eff ,b) Units 0 and 34-40 have been added to the cenplex without conforming with 
plumbing and electrical requirements, open electrical, inparper vents, traps, 
and waist lines. 
Unit 0-7 and 34-40 
UHC 1001(b) The minimum ventilation fron outside i s not provided. 
UHC 1001(e) Smoke detectors are required to be installed.per Uniform Building Code 1210f 
; DEPOSITION 
f EXHIBIT , 
i ^r n 
Unit #35 
UHC 1001(b) The minimum natural light requirement is not provided. 
UHC 1001(b) The minimum ventilaticn from outside is not provided. 
UHC 1001(b) The ceiling covering is sagging or missing. 
UHC 1001(b) The sleeping rocm or bedroom is not provided with an approved window or 
exterior door for emergency escape or rescue. 
Unit #34 
UHC 1001(b) The ceiling covering is sagging or missing. 
Unit #37 
UHC ~ 1001(c) Floor is weak, unlevel, or has holes. 
Unit #5 
UHC 1001(e) Multiple adaptors and portable cards (zip cards) are being used in a hazardo 
way. 
Unit #38 
UHC 1001(e) Multiple adaptors and portable cords (zip cards) are being used in a hazardo 
way. 
Hallways 
UHC 1001(e) The hallway is not provided with adequate light. 
UHC 1001(b) The ceiling covering is sagging or missing. 
City records indicate that additicnal dwelling units have been added to this building withou 
ccnplying with 21.12.010 of the City Code which requires that all zoning codes be met at the 
time of conversion which include number of duelling units 'allowed in the particular zone, 
mininum lot area requirements, and required parking provided. 
Each building is also requlxed under Section 104 of the Building Code to meet all building 
codes at the time of any addition or alteration. 
UHC Sec 202 Because of the above deficiencies, these buildings are determined to be 
substandard and are hereby declared a public nuisance which must be abated 
by repair, rehabilitation, demolition or removal. 
UHC 1104(b) DUE TO THE DEFICIENCIES NOTED CN THE DEFICIENCY LIST, UNIT #35 IS OflSED TC 
OCCUPANCY, AS OF January 31, 1989, UNTIL ALL PERMITS ARE OBTAINED, 
REPAIRS ARE MADE, AND THE UNIT IS REIEASED TO OCCUPANCY BY THIS OFFICE. 
Following correction of de f i c i enc ies , an Inspection must be scheduled throug 
t h i s o f f i ce • 
NOTE: *A COPY OF THIS DEFICIENCY LIST MUST BE SUEMl'lThl) WHH EACH REQUIRED PERMIT. 
SAIfT IAKE CTFY DEPAra^ZMff-«JIipiN3 AND HOUSBE SERVICES 
X^  Jf <><^~^w ^Jc^Sf*4*. ' / ENFORCEMENT OFFICER 
Name Lawrence Saggars , Telephone No, 535-7670 
Legend Yes (X) No (O) 
This Is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
w—,»-uA- ioyu8 bongiaiebnu erlT 
3 Iruorm. <*ril Y3WOM T83MRA3 < 




A INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the propertyT plumbing,'neating 
air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in^appliances, light fixtures'and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, win 
dow and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television"antenna, wail-to-wail carpets, water softener, automatic garage doofopenerWid transmit 
ter(s), fencing^ trees and shrubs f ^ * < ic»v r v dicB o 3 <j*s ^-z ')^ \u C9{£vro^
 v ~- L • n m oebo or BM 03»r, »\,fz ^ncpiq 'snoeisq gitwo 'o* 3n"l 
. . ? _
 V 
B^  INSPECTION. Unless^otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property^upon Buyer's own examination and Judgment and^not Jjy^rejison 
of any representation made to Buyer by Selier*or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as 
tdTts production~Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller'sTwarranties as outlined in SectidnT6~ln the~event Buyer desireTanyadditional inspection" 
saicMnspectlon Shall be allowed by Seller^but Ranged for and paid by Buyer ™ ****»4*^*'*e * f h O « *3MTO QAA ^ ITIJiTU ^QITZSMOO^ 
batoerroj^x. <Jo ic^ie ^ io>uoC* bsioennoo c3 llsw r i j b t^oennoo 5} ;ewsa &kfoqi§3* 
C. SELLER WARRANTIES.-Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any: building or zoning violation concerning the property which' hasjrnbl 
or will not be remedied pnor to closing, (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, jhens or otherjncumbrances.of any nature shall 
be brought current on or before closing, and (cj the plumbing, heating, ajr conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and,appliances shall£e sound or, in 
satisfactory working condition at closing , ^ Q J ~ n be/oennoo £ ~ as8 fsiusn Q fcw^§''T^^S^ 
CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any pnvate well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's Knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
nSKTuse oTthiTwell or wells «s"authored by a state permit or other-legal waVrightr10 * * * * * *<* , 6 to**™* 2? xg™ ^ . J S ^ H ^ ^ J f g P ' f i W ^ 
laoiayriq ineaeiq z\\ ru n s*qaooe
 rwoied a one evoda \o) r norfoeC of tostdua bns ynaQprcq ertt to croifoeqant:lfiu8iv s 93sm asrf iByu8^nottoei^T:xaviJ%IeJ-' f 
_E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of-Seller's knowledge>Jn good working order and^Seller 
has no knowiedge_of any .needed repairs and it .meets all applicable government health_and constructiorTstandards \ ^ y " ^ V ^ L C^ V & * ^ ^ ^ V V ? l g ^ ^ ^ 
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days pnor to closing, Seller shall provide Jo Buyer written venfication as to whether prnot any notes, mortgages, 
deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance "due In the event "of sale if any such document so provides and holder does not Waive the same or unconditional!/ 
approve the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent pnor to closing In such case, 
ail earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer? iTU^undeStcxxTand agreeii that If provisions" foF said "Due* on" Sale" clause are set forth 
n Section 7 herein, 'alternatives allowed herein shall become null and Void, o JZLM SQ^shom gniteixs ns to aonslsd eiomixo-qqs 9^* gnjino29iq9i 
3 o Jfo*r y^q /citron M^ v n^~"-s lsq o*1 ;s teeiatm eissd roiiZQ Ido fluclw 
Q. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less thanfive (5) days prior to closing* Seller shall provide to Buyer either an_abstract of title birought current with an attorney's opinion 
>r,a preliminary title report on the subject property, Pnor to olosing, Buyer shall giveawntten notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title-., 
"hereafter, Seiier shall be required, throughescrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected, if said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agree-
ment at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith" shall be returned to the respective parties. 
Ow -9* ot> J_ i j i o b f n i „ i»a~i,i L_J 2- e n _ 'sqinnq 30J or r^  *1w 
H TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authonzes the Listing Brokerage to order a. preliminary commitment for a policy of title Insurance to be issued 
y such title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain'no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and 
ie encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
hall, unless Buyer ejects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any^ 
ancellation charge • •—* 
) (5) days prior to closing-* I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES, if Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five i 
copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior 
i closing, Buyer shall take title "subject to such leases. If the objection(s) Is not remedied at or prior to closing/ this Agreemenrshall be null and void^eveney^a W^, 
•991QG ie, wS gn onsnrt M\b"r' no <rnj8^ bt6? ?r frs c i c -," grubnal n^s o' ?ru\y l ^ % » 8 o* lot»'du2 9bsm z\ lotto zv\i Bns emse eiuocq loVbna^mrfeafi oi 
tJvCHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. D_unng the pendency of this Agreement, Seiier agrees that npjchangesjnjauiy existing leases shaJl be made, nor^wjeases^ 
J Into, nor ,shall^ any substantial alterations or Improvements bejnade orrundertaken#without the written^ consent of the Buyer - boeoxs of Jon efin !29T9ini ns 
o.b n&ol ©DBQI f>'-» _ __ _ x ^t 'w >sq oj 2oeioc w h2 souon n9)tnw^oqu ioile3 sril 'o ncnur o'l* )B *\detoov ed HsrifclnsfnatjiQA elfil Jnem^eipA aid] \o 
2;<>co nsoi ' ^ m a iti^uQ -ot bs?u <$d ^t Z l Z yaq ot sseiea is»i^ qomboa n! d Z beeoxe'orJon »emioq 
*GE ONE OF A FOUR PAGE FORM 1 -IsiHnl 4 I J < J 1 . . »lta ( \ ( ) elellfnl a'-elfea miol ensq luot s to ^ >wt ecej?_ 
r«aV/v, nocu; f EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
'0} oH f)<) g£Y tnspjU 
DATE W/M /*? 
fi«r« *• > *to « »*V*»fc j tnai»i«ootr i Jr- t?**fJ 'ori Jwmotf oi/bfifct Uapol t -»t it*" 
The undersigned Buyer {///lYA/£ Tfi//A*!*£// *SA7lTy(DA hereby deposits with Brokera^ 
>T MONEY theamnnntnf j) A)£ -Trf/) '/JTJ4 A/O / ) / / / > / Hollar* <S //?/jD. 00 
be/tteposited in accordance with applicable State7 Law t&"( 'lir** ~A'3 
as EARNES  
In the form _ 
which shall G b ' * ^ / ; ^ „ ^ - i ^
. *
 n Received by _ i 
Brokerage Phone Number £" "» 
OFFEFT f o PURCHASE 
0 y n > i « P f-t 
1. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given fo secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at / 7 4/-P J . 
^ ^ / ^ ^r7~ in the City of -T&/7* ^/?{«-£. County of S/4/ jT £. rf ty€~ Utar 
subject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer r 
accordance with Section G Said property is owned by / " 7 / ^ •^/TA^\- O f^< * a s sellers, and Is more particularly describee 
as
 CtfP/^ot- <w & r^L 1 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
.
 D Q UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY .,. (g)Vacant Lot 0 Vacant Acreage 0 OHw AJ/A-
i UpJ^ IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY * .
 w $ Commercial u © Residential 0 Condo ,Q Other, / v / / ? A W k « -
* t* -(a) Included Items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall Include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A If presently attached to the propem 
The following personal property shall also be Included In this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title •»& / / 7~//£~ 
r0
^(b| Excluded Items: The following Hems are specificaflyVxc/uo& from this sate * ~£*{?jf^psJ/itt »"* 07^/"^** f1* 
em nDiteJns^G-i? /r.s » 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property .includes .the following improvements jn „the ourchase^ price 
£3 public sewer J2 connected 0 well (3 connected 0 other * $ electricity 5? connected " ! 
'o@-sePl{c tank»eqct3 connectedjiotl Mo tcto'v griinox i 0 lrrlgationvwater / secondary systemjvtoen ?arl railed («]3jngress & egress^ by1 private*easementjj32 0 
,f
*-0 other sanitanrsystemT—»* »N<»r w —« •? ^ ^rp^r i of shares ^^ ^ -^ -t <%- h Company-f <",>< **- n^p gnoif Q dedicated road ^ S paved 'beme' 9<|)on li"* i 
•
 n
^ public Water ,?^lfo'nne"cle<J^^,jte'- icirjscio -)3"TV antenna '* Q3 master*antenna ^ pfewired'^^^'cljrbVnd g u H e V ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i n e i w ^ u w l - -
| 3 private water 0 connected \ H natural gas EJ connected , , W Qth»r rffitr^"^ nollbfTC^ cnJ^jf yiotafi^s 
laocr" «^ v -• ^ ; oc* TTect)bfi ntr b^ >i! J?^ «»ob<? *±rl ?\*Ato&<,') *f3d ^-} o* zn\t / ^ ^^\\f n~n$> '*># t^fivn-j<{PS IM . , neiu., to i ,o iw i.» *- ^ IMUK? ~" 
(d) Survey. A certified survey D shall be furnished at the expense of /is fri - pnnr to closing, Q shall not be ft 
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual Inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 .(c) above and 6 below, accepts it if} its present 
% L« condition, except/ 
tF -JVrV. „ 
fctton. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 .(c) above and 6 below, accepts it fa its present -=J 
]
 1/ ( to j£}^ &££ ^ b ^ ^ f r f 7 * > V y i / / g ^ tftn C*Q/V/>/'yrY 'd / ' t / W l i *** *• *r£\ haS«v^ v7i4 H m^lwnnX o^ ^  
2^PURCHASYPmce'X'NO FINANCING:fheHot^rp'JKKnt'pnea forThe pVop t^y &&/Y*J^l//Jflfc0*Tto^fry&*&'/ffiUP#itf0 
- T7^  -/-.M ^ - ^xf j»u mil,* ivi<.v*^ -u »-w- a _• t, <iHo»v _ y. ; imTTZTT^ nn } Q\\e liriiio/i-c ,i MI >JO sa«oit,u -*i in-r ei»; 9 brooo io^ b IB emi ?29i^ f *• 
Ifun Inorneei^ A &*Hf «->s!oob dl r^tqo «v1/ evert ileriaieYuO ^B2 enTevc-^ c 
$ , </Y,0cf(A*()Q representing th# approximate balance1;of CASH DOWN PAYMENT atj:losing b 9 n l u J ^ ,^ »,^3 jnemeeigA *M> i^ bnu bevleoei y^ nom Jwmse * 
$ representing thd approximate balance of an existing mortgage trust deed note^ reaJ estate contract or othecencumbrance to be assumed by buyer 
which obligation bears Interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
, »,nr»i. -n*. t | j * which included CD pnncipal, * * 0 Interest, ® ^ D taxes 1 • D insurance; " ^ QWndo fees^ 0 V D nth^r^ lolt tlOITQ3q3Vtl 3JT1T £ 
er encumGfancesA,f'o ^  
s ieibf3 isrts3 *^ 
if^/ AYwW representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or oth bi 
y
» \ ' * - aj")i v * * , r i k 1 ^" ' * ' 1 , f i iV"7 r **p^» ? •» ifi/tj 1 ".ii v c* <e •*
 -#io r*( <»ni3 a» f?»o»o * wo*->3q do r^; ho u 7t>*Ti'W{n aieilri 
assumed oy Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ ZX.y //<v. u ? 
which include: i • principal, • Interest, • taxes D insurance, U condo fees, U other 
representing balance, if,any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan,.or seller financing, to be paid as follows* /ft \/f?/?/2S*~ 
<•/op tfiifee-fFsf— /*f/>kY«~f>Ay/»€*tr *-fz-/^3&~j#pee /»^\/^f/'— 
CW £>ot,fr>fW//»6'^r /IT CLoftA/Crw'LL B€ AG/WC& To #q>S?^&"*e * 6W».< 0 TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
s^- i» i ^ i & i r ( M ui^DOtlol eietos 'tl'tiS :"v^ E3l TO ->a«?«l gnitdixe nsoJ loojdurf e»M
 w» ,uyot ^  ievw<3 M .233A3J TMAM3T OMIT2JX3 . 
»" o P ° -}<} ij-iM J^r-d • - - i/uS t{d nevp it no«'^ nio no/ w^ 6Ui^ n'»areT ? ^I" J ^4^0*0 cVl oirtTO*^ o^t*»T3r*J alnemonnna y,le b^ ifl) ?9«jei gnlteix^ HB lo W « 
If Buyer is required to-assume an Underlying obligation (In which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain^ outside financing, Buyer agrees to use,best effort 
to assume and/or procure same and fhls offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending Institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agree-
to make application within '***« r ^ y 4 Qhltat daya"flftAr Seller's acceptance of this Agreement fo assume* the underlying 'obligation anaVdr^ o^ taTn^ R f^iew f^Trianyng a 
an interest rate not to exceed ^A a flrtf lc% If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or flnancingglthln0 ^ afisrlvO *™tr%?yZZn£r&*\\£f's ac?»-i^S 
af this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice Seller agrees to pay up to ts mortgage loJ « 
aomts, not to exceed $ Q In addition, seller agrees to pay $ O to be used for Buyer's other loan costs 
Page two of a four page form Seller's Initials ( ) ( ) Date Buyer's Initials ( ) (,o^!) ISA* fOate*JL3CL3^G-2Z* 
_. « ww.,,«.^,„H ,nioi«5>. ..ian oe maae as set Tonn in section 5. seiier agrees to\^ ^.ish good and marketable title to the property/siibjec 
rttmr,tw£\tiM an nr.rrmrn^o«'et«<i QK?msr^\<ri*v«rW'> \<-.--^ ^<i 10 -n ^«»?9 \<:n o*M*v<nii£o nrvirvtomrr, s u» -r*!!*- 10 iovi»fl--t! ?fraI'-AW UV.vO i'TlnO*U*At:# 
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by Q a current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price C&an.abstract, of title brought current 
with an attorney's opinion (See Section H)/ ^ 
•;:*4. INSPECTION. Of5 TITLE. In;accordance with.Section G,- Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect,the title to the-subject property priorto dosing. ;Buyer shall.take titte 
subject to any; existing restrictive c o v e n ^ 
5. VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest*in Buyer asT fo l lows:" ' J" f l /A7 ' . 7J *« ^T^^^/V r-S/'-%*~Z~ ' ? I l ^ v w - ^ ^ '\ ~-v 
6. SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:. ou \(iA .dHj-i iU;^a i.»uUw 
Exceptions to the above and Section'C shall be limited to the"following:. :•-.'*'X-otil Ml .Cu'S*. ^ Y i ;fTA-: ^J^3TV, l \V£UA-3; 




CCrWcWW- " - m ^ / A v e V?&>:*&•/•//•'i>"-|->L^*p.v<r • / ^ ,-»i-f ••/-*!. I S - 1 > ,1-r->-''.'>'•• fl'>'/•> '/V/» VJVy, 
R 9v!r>-vl Ot ?-li03 oi •? 
:#&y£0^&*lt-^y?™wfl>7™Ai&x, ^ ^ ; ) y > ^ r r , ; ' ' ' ^ 1 ?y*afr/ <A^Va^^/T^jm^-r>4?^^ 
y '#(/¥£& \ r"' A-/o t/J^ ' >"^ r r V ,i te/3 
8. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before J )<^£ ' < ^ ? « ^ / V*? r 1 9 - at a reasonable location to be designated by 
Seller, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing "office all documents necessary to complete the purchase, in accordance: with 
this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of D date of possession D date of closing • other *>**'• *h lr? ''-'"A - *~%"> ??* ^ ' • • - 7«'•••'* ><?IS\.9:r. 
,9..^POSSESSIONvSeller"shall.deHyer possession to Buyer on '"*" :~•'[[•• 
lOrAGENCY DISCLOSURE.^ the signing of this Agreement the listing agent 
;0.<3^-ffti> c * 
.unless extended by written agreement of.part ies^.^^^^^^^p^g 
l^irepresents. (>-),Seller '(*)'•) Buyerij •"V-H -t c:r: 
!llll!lll represents ( ')' Seller ( ) Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior"tqjsignirigjhis Agreement.' and the selling agent _ 
written.disclosure, of4he,agencyjrelatiqnsbip(s) was provided to him/her.,{} 3<j) (..^i) Buyer's.initials (v>.•:).( M ) Seller's .initials.;VAliU—ap^3^3.^0^:3l3Kft^S3 
^*T1? GENERAL PROVISIONS? MMI'SCO" nTucb\A/icc"iKirSi>ATcrri" A P O U C . Tuc'/scitffcDAi' bbrw/icinM' Q C O T I O M C nMTUc:'pc\7cpccf ciWc ucfnpnc'uAV/CTPC:I=NJ^ 
ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER4/ 
:t?»u» uenr-ts-sis.- <;7.ner»Tw.«am V»J 
12. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the :ab6ye;jterms.and|cpnditioVs;.Sell^ 
" ; • ' • * • : • - ' • • : . - • : . ; • : • • : : . . • • . • • • . • • ; • . - • . • • . • . • . • . . . • • • • • • . • • / • • • :. . : • • • / • ; . . : • ' * • • f r i . ^ ^ . - : ; : ; ' i v ^ b ' : ^ : " . > ^ ^ 
have until: jfAM/P.MJ^ii . . .19,^ -^ to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and.the Agent shailreturn the .EARN EST.: 
^ W v M i r . i ^ i L P i y ^ ^ S ^ erti lot cln9m22«,^hT>s<jpxsT r-eiteS yd cisq eci ilsris ^ 9 ? J l r t ) ^ r ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ r ^ ^ ^ ? ^ ^ * T l P i - ^ . ^ ^ < v ^ ^ D l ^ f r f 3 o o f i r t f .eor^r uanUr/dr ; fV5 ,U3 Q f t i 1 0 t 
(Buyer's ^ Signature)
 ; ~ . -
 J
 -- "^ - (Date) 
(Bu'yVr^sTgrratiife) ^ ^ P ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ' f ^ . ^ ^ ^ T D a t e ) wjf/?i:^JBft|Kte!jrB; 
. ,,(Phone)
 : ^ : . ; « ; i ' r 2 ^ ; (SSN/TAX^D)| 
1 ^ 0 1 / ^ j l ^ ^ > 0 W Y 3 ^ Q g ^ T ^ ^ ^ ^ / 
(Address/ . 
•it, ^*feee> ••^ff.-e?fls\^ ,Qii^  sot ? ^  19.^ fr^  
ufe ^r iatUfe  ^ ^ H P X  
jetton anMOfisyuif^i 
> accept .the terms-" 
> « - . r - •-• • - - - — • - - - •* 
specifiedJ^loj^,slia^s^ ;.c^(r^^ A-!3-3mllr;ri3 "ooiie^oit8,.i .-^lef. "s'rff or" CBOTjgiVtoi vno^tnQmsoi^A-^^ 
n tv^ i i i
 l4>a*{Ci; . P{Ju*.w r tUiJO^ ;v ... >—>V*. i i -vV. : - <, . »• - - , 
z • 4 4 ^ 
,. / (Date) / .• / TTime) . / (Seller's Signature) / (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAXfjD) 
(Date) '(Time) (Address) (Seller's Signature) 
CHECK ONE: 
D ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
D REJECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. (Buyer's Initials) 
• COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
(Phone) '(SSN/TAX ID) v 
(Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed) 
A. D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing ail signatures: 
SIGNATURE OF SELLER SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
Date Oata 
Data Date 
. , 1 9 . .by. 3. Q I personally caused, a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on_ -
Certified.Mail and return^re<»ipt''attached"heretort6 th i iTn"g^ iAr"nBi^ l , ^tVhy!aa tMMon 3T*T?n . t<W M A T H 3 H T V*? CT3VO*qqA K33fi gAH MftO>>iHr? 
Page three of a four page form 
K AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on Its behalf.warrant 
his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller -
L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This Instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels an 
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agre« 
ment This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties *n » •• r ' v ' " 3 T I *o ': ' , "33V , 
M COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and, if attached hereto, shall Incorporate all the provisions of this Af 
not expressly modified or excluded therein 
N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER ANO ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damage 
or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of default by Seller or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express conditio 
or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned t 
Buyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the delaulting party shall pay all costs and expense* 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedv provided hereunder or by at 
plicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an ir 
terpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from th 
earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount of deoosit remaining after advancing those costs sha 
be interpleaded into court In accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney 
fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action. 
O. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement 
P RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property betwee 
the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, Hood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten_percer 
(10%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees In writing to repair or replace 'damaged propert 
prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repa 
or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
Q TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport,*strike* 
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closm 
date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provide'd herein Jhereaftej 
time is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed" In 
delivered by all parties to the transaction 'f; - : / J - D V ^ S " y e i r - , <-<! - _ *,i.<l 3 . ' U T ' . J ; ; J A ? C i *nwt J 3UfT CIA 35 v,ioflUr» O r TlizUultte* Sf 
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and BuyeYshall each payone'-rialf (*A) 0? the escrow closing'fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution^ Costs of^rov/din 
title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer/rents, and inferes 
on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assignedto Buye 
atcloslhg- joj—^ (orioiS)"*" i \vyi*.ti^) * ^TooT *" "" (eiuisnp^a i9\ui 
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCINGJf this, agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shaljjae conveyed by warrantydleed free of detects other than those e> 
cepted herein If this Agreement is (or~sale~or transfer of a Seller's Interest under arfexistincj real estate'contract; SeHer may transfer by either (I) spedaljwarranty- deec 
containing Seller's assignment of said contract In forrr\,sufflcient to convey after acquiredJitle or (b^by.ilJDew jea{ estate cg^radJqc^p^Ung^^^^^^g, res 
estate contract therein *" " ;" rT!~~ "~ ' ~-*~-u* - ~* ~ -~ * " f ' ^ T t " * ~ - * / K ~ ~ ,=rar<t'^yf^'T ^ - ^ * ' ~* " : T * ' "T BVtt *H 
_ „ . ^ _ . . . . . r ^rir"' est-,,-, , •* * • *-hr- - »»-»- .«•"-*•* i-» r *c*»~ ~>n * *» « - 3 - "•-!'*"» * _*'-«,->- , -«M o. 3P iM*" * f , T ^ ^ 3 0 ^r\ a o H A W f 
T. NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided In this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days*after-tbe occurrence or non-o* J 
of the event with respect to which notice js required If any such timely required notice is not given, Jhe contingencywith respect to which Uhe notice was to~u ^ *e 
Is automaticallyJierminated and(thls Agreements In full force and,effect. If a.person other than^the Buyer or the Sellers designated(tg receive nojicejjn^ehajfj^th: 
Buyer or the Seller,' notice to the'person'so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person fofreceipt of notice. ' ** ^ ' "" 7MV"~ *" 
r *r: • -? "is-oa c » „ . ° f , JL 1 {NiH.MA) I I .TJ cwwi Ut>m «j. j f l sonsiqetDsa 3 leyo* \ r -'i WO Ra THUOO bisa alrea^ia 
U BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate^office0^109^ 
V. DAYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays" 
PAGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. 
THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH,REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL' — l\JULYUtrt987 
cmot OQoq iuo» ft to oenrtt »r 
